➡ Edmund Debar interviews Middle East analyst, Nuin Rabani, discussing the current state of the Iran war. They discuss the possibility of successful negotiations, the impact of the war on Iran’s leadership, and the potential risks for Iran. The interview also touches on the reasons behind the U.S.’s involvement in the war, with suggestions of influence from Israel. The conversation concludes with the uncertainty of the situation and the potential outcomes.
➡ The text discusses the U.S. and Israel’s strategic decisions in the Middle East, and how these have often defied predictions of disaster. It highlights how Trump’s actions, such as recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and assassinating General Soleimani, did not lead to the predicted consequences. The text also discusses Israel’s strategy to become the dominant power in the Middle East, and how this has led to conflicts with Iran and territorial expansion. However, it notes that Israel’s reliance on U.S. support may be threatened by changing political attitudes in the U.S.
➡ Israel’s support from its most reliable group, white evangelical Christians, is declining, especially among the younger generation. This could lead to significant problems for Israel, as it relies heavily on international support, particularly from the U.S. and Europe. The article also discusses the hypothetical scenario of Israel returning to its 1967 borders for peace, but concludes that this is unlikely due to the rightward shift in Israeli politics. Lastly, it suggests that President Trump’s unconditional support for Israel could potentially backfire, as it encourages Israel’s extremist tendencies and could lead to future problems.

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Hi, my name is Edmond DeMars. I’m the executive editor of the Trends Journal. I’m happy to be here today. It’s Friday, April 24th, with Muin Rabani. He’s the Middle east analyst and co editor of Jadalia magazine. Moween, thank you so much for joining the Trends Journal. Thank you for having me. It’s a pleasure to be with you. I wanted to get right into it. Obviously, we see the Iran war is sort of in a holding pattern right now. We don’t know what’s going to happen. Trump said today, or the White House said today that Kushner and Witkoff are headed back into the region in hopes of negotiations this weekend.

Do you see Vance stayed back? Do you see any chance of this negotiation potentially being successful? And unlike previous ones, is there anything to lead you to believe that the situation change at all, that both parties are more willing to negotiate in good faith and come to terms to end this war? Not really. Although as often, you know, there could be so much happening behind the scenes that we may be surprised. I think the current situation is one where we have a ceasefire without an agreement, and I think that’s unsustainable. I think it’s unsustainable for all the parties involved, for the United States, for Iran, for the Gulf states, because in the absence of an agreement, the US Will maintain its blockade of the Iranian coast, the Iranians will maintain their control over the Strait of Hormuz, and something is going to have to give.

It will be only a matter of time before either the Americans shoot up a ship off the Iranian coast or the Iranians attack a US Ship or things and Lebanon gets so escalate to an extent that the Iranians respond against Israel. And most importantly, I think, you know, if you put yourself in the shoes of an insurance broker in London, which is A capital for maritime insurance. Are you going to be sufficiently reassured by the ceasefire that insurance rates are going to come down to the level that all these ships can start purchasing it again, or you going to be a little risk averse and maintain very high levels of insurance until there’s an actual agreement? And so I think, you know, we’re at a fork in the road.

Either there’s going to be at least a U. S Iranian framework agreement which formalizes the ceasefire and creates the space for a month or two or three for serious negotiations to see if an agreement can be reached, or we’re going to get renewed military escalation and which direction we’re going to go. I think at this stage, the jury is still out. The prevailing theme from the White House right now is that the military effort has been very successful from the US Standpoint and it destroyed the Iranian regime, what the White House calls the regime in Iran.

Do you think Trump is accurate when he says that the leadership in Iran is fractured and it’s hard to deal with these, I guess, interests fighting for power in Iran? Do you think Trump is being honest when he makes such a statement? Well, is, is he ever honest? You know, the question is, is, is he kind of being, you know, the carnival barker, or does he actually believe what he’s saying? And at the end of the day, I don’t think it really matters that much. I mean, let’s, let’s look at what actually happened when this war was launched on 28 February, the US and Israel laid out a very clear set of objectives.

Regime change in Tehran, eliminating its nuclear program, eliminating its ballistic missile program, ending Iranian support for its regional allies and the coalition that calls itself the axis of resistance. Now, in late April, when you look at what is actually being discussed as a basis for negotiations, not only have none of those objectives been achieved, but we’re very much focused on resolving issues that didn’t even exist when the war started. You know, the, the whole issue of free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. There was no issue with, with safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz on the 27th of February.

Yet now this is somehow the main issue that needs to be addressed and resolved. No one is really talking about Iran’s ballistic missile program or its regional alliances anymore. So sure, you know, when, when Trump announced the ceasefire and later said that there’s no agreement because the Iranian leadership is too fractured because the US has already, in his view, achieved regime change, it was really a capitulation to reality being presented as a sign of Iranian weakness. Is there a risk that Tehran has right now that its leadership could be overplaying its hand and that it’s. Even though it was able to go blow to blow with the United States for a while, that they could be almost like Trump being a little too hubristic? And in their approach to future negotiations, in a potential future war, do you see that being a risk for Tehran or are they truly in the driver’s seat? Yes, absolutely.

I mean, the Iranians are absolutely convinced that their position is now strengthened. And the main reason is because they now have leverage that in value, I would argue, exceeds even that of a nuclear weapon, which is control over this absolutely vital global maritime choke point known, as. Known as the straight of hormones. But more importantly, the Iranians are convinced that time is on their side and that they can outlast the Americans and that if the status quo that we have now continues, it’s something that the Iranians can endure for much longer than the Americans. And so therefore, they essentially turn, just need to sit back and wait until the Americans come back to them with a better offer.

Now, I think there is some basis for saying that. I mean, in Iran’s case, the only one that’s really suffering from. From the US Blockade and so on is, is Iran itself, you know, and, and to a certain extent, its regional allies, particularly Hezbollah. But on the other side, the Iranians have managed to transform what was envisioned as a bilateral war between Iran on the one hand, and the US And Israel on the other, into not only a regional crisis, but a global economic crisis. And people now are talking about what is a price shock rapidly escalating into becoming a supply shock.

So the Iranians, in my view, are convinced that as this gets worse, the Americans will become more flexible. Now, that calculation may prove correct, but it may also be the case that the Americans decide that rather than take a more flexible attitude towards Iran, they’re going to try to resolve this with military escalation. There are, of course, risks associated with that because the Americans committed so much to this war already and fail to achieve any of their strategic objectives, that it’s clear the only real chance they have of achieving those objectives is by committing many more resources to this war.

In some cases resources they may not even have. But I think the Iranians, as your question suggested, yes, you know, they may well be overconfident, given how things have gone so far. Are you surprised that the US Went to war again with Iran? And even though nobody has an answer to this, what do you think. Why do you think the US Is involved in a war right now? Do you think it’s because of the influence from Israel? Is this what Netanyahu wanted? Some people are saying that. Others are saying Trump would say Iran just can’t have a nuclear weapon and there was a risk there.

Why do you think the U.S. of course, is just an opinion. Why do you think. Why do you think the US Is at war right now with Iran? Well, that’s a $64,000 question, and I don’t think anyone can give an absolutely definitive answer to that. But let’s look at what we do know. What we do know is that this is a war that Israel has been agitating for for decades, that they. This is a war that they have tried to persuade every successive US Administration to engage in. And all of them, including the first Trump administration, have responded with an unambiguous no.

Why did the US Sign on to it this time? Well, I do think, you know, this key meeting that was held at the White House between Trump and Netanyahu on the 11th of February, and that was extensively reported in the New York Times, was a key moment, because at that meeting, Netanyahu convinced Trump that if there were to be a successful decapitation strike at the outset of the war, that it would be short, sharp, decisive, and end in an unambiguous US Victory within three to four days. Now, look at this from Trump’s perspective, and I can’t remember who made this point, but I think it’s a very important one.

During the first Trump administration, he was told that if he were to recognize Israel’s claims of sovereignty over Jerusalem, the Middle east would erupt in flames. He recognized those claims, and essentially, you know, the. The regional fire never started. Then he was told that if he were to assassinate the head of the Quds Force of the Islamic Republican Guard Corps, General Qasem Soleimani, that war would ensue between the US And Iran. He assassinated Soleimani, and nothing happened. You know, Venezuela during this term, there were all kinds of warnings about the consequences, and there weren’t any. And in that context, you know, since you were asking earlier about overconfidence, it may well be that it was that much easier for Netanyahu to persuade Trump to engage in this war and to persuade him that it would be easy and successful, given that the experts, so to speak, as far as Trump was concerned, had repeatedly been proven wrong in the past.

And so therefore, he was more amenable to listen to those who were giving him Essentially a pep talk. That’s the first thing. Second of all, you had a very clear alignment between the Israeli position, which I’ve already discussed, along with elements in this administration who, either because they’re very close to Israel or for reasons of their own, you know, given decades of hostility towards Iran or, you know, increased Pentagon budgets or whatever, had their own reasons to want this war. And when you get the confluence of these various interests and agenda, you had the perfect rationale for this war.

How dangerous is the Greater Israel Project, and what role do you see that playing in any kind in. In this current war going on? Well, let me answer that in two parts. The first is less related to the Greater Israel Project and has more to do with the national security doctrine that Israel adopted after the Palestinian attacks of October 7th. And it was a shift from not ensuring, you know, what’s called the qualitative military edge, which is that Israel is in a position to defeat any combination of Arab forces, forces, and would and would take preemptive action, so to speak, against any genuine threat that emerged in the Middle East.

That was kind of the old strategic doctrine. The new one is that you nip any emerging threat in the bud even. Even before it becomes real. Closely tied to that is this idea that Israel needs to become the regional hegemon, that it needs to be the unchallenged and unchallengeable power throughout the Middle East. And to do that, it needs to take apart, defeat, dismantle this coalition known as the axis of resistance. So, Unado, and I’m now presenting the Israeli view, it’s an octopus in which you have these individual tentacles. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq and Syria, the ousted Assad regime.

You have the head of the octopus, which is the Islamic Republic of Iran. And Israel feels that it has been successful in dismantling the tentacles. And so the final step is crushing the head. And it is in that context that we also need to understand the current war against Iran. The problem is that the other part of that, of course, is that Israel is now in the process of not only territorial expansion in Lebanon, in Syria, in. In the west bank and. And the Gaza Strip, but is also establishing these depopulated buffer zones that, if Israel is left to its own devices, will become new zones of settlement and territorial expansion in the future.

Now, the irony here is that the war against Iran was supposed to be the final act in this regional project of establishing unchallenged Israeli hegemony. But what we’re noticing is that, in fact Israel is coming up against the limits of its power even as it’s already talking about Turkey being next and so on. And you know, you look at Israel on a map, you know, it’s a small state, it’s quite vulnerable in the sense that it’s, it’s demographic and economic and industrial concentration is in a fairly small area, certainly compared to Iran, limited manpower. It’s not really, and of course entirely dependent on foreign military, political support.

It’s not really a state and society that is capable of the perpetual war that will be required for it to, for this project to succeed. Is there a country that you watch in the region that’s almost like the wild card that no one’s really talking about, but it’s something that’s just wise. Would it be Turkey? Would it be the Saudis? What countries? The country that no one’s talking about and, and should be? Well, I think it’s, we need to look more at the entire region rather than a specific country. For example, you take the gcc, the Gulf Cooperation Council, this, these six Gulf states, how are they going to be affected by this war which has been, you know, profoundly unsettling to say the least for them.

From their perspective, the value of their alliance with the United States is that Washington is the ultimate guarantor of their national security. Yet the swornow that from their point of view was launched by the US without consulting them, not on the basis of any interests that they have. Certainly if you compare it, for example, to the 1991 Kuwait War, this war has become the most profound threat to their national security. Are they now going to reassess the relationship with the United States in terms of looking more, let’s say, at regional guarantors of security, like Egypt, like Turkey, like Pakistan, perhaps others.

The other one to look at I think, is Egypt. You know, Egypt has been stable, I think, for about 5,000 years, but is now really undergoing a significant economic crisis. It’s certainly affected by the double whammy of first the Ukraine war and now the Iran war. And you get the impression that this is a society on the knife’s edge that may or may not erupt in popular protest in the coming year or so. You have Pakistan, which now has a mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia that apparently the Saudis sought to invoke, but unsuccessfully during the current war.

But how is, how is that going to play out? So it’s more, I think, a question of how the regional constellation of forces, if you will, as we have noted in recent decades, is going to be affected and potentially transformed by the Iran war rather than necessarily what is going to happen in any individual state. Do you think Israel is safer today than it has been? Do you think it’s working? Do you think the idea that it has in taking the land south of the Latani river in Lebanon, we have a fractured Syria. You have Iran right now, fate squaring off against the United States.

Is Israel in a position where its reasonable objectives for the region it’s seeing play out right now? And you know, it might be a hard point right now, but is this favorable if you’re in Netanyahu’s cabinet, is this favorable position for Israel right now? I would say yes and no. I mean, getting the U.S. you know, to launch this war against Iran is obviously a massive strategic success and you know, that isn’t over yet. So we can’t make any definitive statements. But if it ends the way it is today, then quite clearly it has been inconclusive and arguably has left Iran in a stronger position.

Second of all, if you look at Israel’s more immediate environment, you know, Hamas is effectively destroyed. It’s gobbling up the west bank by the day with minimal international criticism or condemnation. It is establishing this buffer zone in southern Lebanon and as you mentioned, has basically managed to demilitarize Syria during the past year and in the months after the Assad regime was ousted from Damascus. So if you look at it, I would say in a purely military perspective, if you will, you can make the argument that Israel is sitting pretty, perhaps not as pretty as it hoped to or it wanted to, but certainly nothing dramatic.

But on top of this, I think you have to look at Israel’s geostrategic and global position. And my response to that question is to point out that from my point of view, Israel’s signal strategic achievement, more valuable than any weapon system it has, is that is the bipartisan political support it has traditionally enjoyed in the United States. There was never much of an argument between Democrats and Republicans, certainly of their party leaderships, about supporting Israel. If anything, traditionally they sought to out compete each other. And who was more supportive? For Israel, that has thoroughly transformed over the past two years.

With the exception of a few prominent leaders, Israel has lost the Democratic Party, the rank and file. Now, you know, you have people openly disassociating themselves from AIPAC in order to preserve their political careers. I mean, imagine, you know, who would have ever thought that politicians seeking public office would disassociate themselves from AIPAC for opportunistic reasons? And now you have this growing debate within the Republican Party about the value of Israel, and that has intensified, particularly as a result of the Iran war, much more than because of anything that happened in Gaza. Support for Israel is even declining significantly within what has in recent decades been Israel’s most reliable constituency.

And that’s not the American Jewish community, but white evangelical Christians. And among younger evangelicals, there’s been a significant loss of support for Israel as well. Now, these changes will, of course, take time to work themselves through the political system, but you do have the situation where it was precisely as a result of Israel’s military successes the past two years and the enormous costs and blood and death and tens of thousands of dead children and public relations and all of it, that Israel is losing the most valuable strategic asset it has ever had. And, you know, Israel is not a country that can easily survive without the rest of the world.

It can, it cannot fight these wars without the support it has had from the United States, the political support of the Europeans and so on. And when that changes it, I think it’s increasingly clear that it will change. Israel is going to have a very, very significant problem on its hands if Israel came out. This is a little bit now off the Iran war, just more towards the regional issue. I don’t want to keep you too long. I promise you a half hour, that’s fine. And this is, of course, very complicated and complex question that would require its own, you know, documentary.

But if Israel came out tomorrow and said, you know what, we will return the 1967 borders, we want to get along with everyone. Well, you know, let’s, let’s move forward. We, we want peace. Do you think peace would be achievable if Israel said, you know, started with something like that, or of course, it’s more complicated than just saying, you know, that, but is there something that Israel could say tomorrow to get, get the ball rolling to peace and stability finally in the Middle East? Well, first of all, that would never happen. I think there was a period when that would have been a serious possibility.

I think if an Israeli government tomorrow said that tomorrow morning, it would be overthrown by tomorrow evening because Israeli society and politics has shifted very far to the right in recent decades. But for the sake of argument, let’s say that that would happen. Then you would be faced with a situation where Israel was essentially finally accepting what’s known as the Arab Peace Initiative that was issued in the spring of 2002, which offered Israel full normalization in return for a full withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries. And a negotiated resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. Is that offer still on the table? Formally, it is.

Does Arab public opinion still accept that deal? I don’t think so. Certainly not in the context of the past two years. But you would have, I think, a preponderance of Arab governments that would jump at this opportunity because they don’t want to have to deal with this issue and all the instability and legitimacy problems it causes for them, and they would jump at this opportunity to put this issue behind them. And I think if they did so, they would probably have the capacity to impose it on their own societies. But again, you know, the longer this goes on, the more difficult it becomes to envision such a scenario.

My, my final question, Muwan Rabani, My final question is, does, does Trump love Israel too much? Meaning, does his affection and his willingness to at least apparently do everything that Netanyahu wants, does that end up hurting Israel? And if you had a little bit more of a sane White House, like, let’s say, even like a, let’s say a Joe Biden, who at least would put up some parameters. Remember when he, I remember he, he sanctioned some Israeli settlers, the most violent Israeli settlers. At least he made that announcement. He held back some heavy bombs during the Gaza genocide.

Does Trump’s penchant and interest in Israel, does that end up hurting Israel? Well, if you look at the discussion we’ve had today, you know, the irony is that Israel, as a result of this unconditional support that it has had from the US Is now confronting the limits of its own power. The reason that Israel has become such an extremist state in society is, is because of the systematic impunity it has enjoyed over many decades, primarily, but not exclusively from the U.S. i think the Europeans are at least as guilty in, in this context as, as are the Americans.

You know, does. You spoke about Trump’s affection for Israel. I don’t think Trump really has affection for anyone or anything. And the interesting question here is that if the Iran war does end up as a major political problem for Trump, he’s not, of course, not going to take responsibility. Sure, he can fire Hegseth or maybe a few generals, but ultimately, he’s going to have to find he’s going to have to throw red meat to his base. And it’s quite plausible that in that context, he would throw Israel under the bus. So I guess that’s one way to answer your question.

But quite clearly, when you consistently encourage a country’s worst instincts by never restraining it and by enabling its, its worst behavior. You know, you’re not only endangering yourself, but, yes, I would argue you’re even, you know, and the spoiled child who’s never. Who’s never told to stop eating candy or to brush its teeth is going to end up with one very massive toothache in a lot of root canals. On that note, Muan Rabani, the co editor of Jadalia, the magazine, thank you so much for joining the Trends Journal. Thank you. It was a pleasure being with you.

Thank you.
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