➡ Ed DeMarsh from Trends Journal interviews Matt Ho, a senior fellow from Eisenhower Media Network, about the potential war with Iran. Matt suggests that the possible conflict with Iran might be linked to Israel’s annexation of the West Bank. He believes that the war could serve to distract from the annexation and remove support for Palestinians. Matt also discusses the concept of a ‘Greater Israel’ and the role of other Middle Eastern countries in this scenario.
➡ The Trump administration opposes the annexation of the West Bank and supports the Abraham Accords, which Saudi Arabia may join if there are no issues with the West Bank. However, Israel is using a land registration process to claim unregistered or vacant land in the West Bank as state property, arguing that this is in line with the Oslo Accords. This has led to an increase in Israeli settlers in the West Bank, establishing Israeli control regardless of international law. The Israeli plan may involve forcing Palestinians into urban areas, making conditions unlivable, and potentially leading to a military ethnic cleansing similar to what occurred in Gaza.
➡ The text discusses disappointment with Iran’s lack of support for Palestine and Lebanon against the US and Israel. It questions Iran’s military capabilities and suggests that Iran avoided war to prevent giving the US and Israel what they wanted. The text also mentions the role of the Houthis in Yemen, who have shown support for Palestine. The author suggests that the timing of a potential war with Iran could be influenced by the Winter Olympics and the positioning of US naval forces.
➡ The text discusses the potential impact of the Houthis in a possible war involving Iran and the U.S. It questions the U.S.’s ability to handle conflicts with both Yemen and Iran, especially if the situation drags on. The text also explores the possibility of the U.S. stirring up civil unrest in Iran, similar to what happened in Syria years ago. Lastly, it mentions the uncertainty of the outcome and the potential consequences for the region, including the strengthening of Israel if Iran is weakened.
➡ The Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, have a unique relationship with the U.S. and Israel, which they believe protects them from the same fate as Iran. However, there are concerns that this special status may not last, and these states are taking steps to establish their own regional alliances and control. There’s also a possibility of these countries considering nuclear armament for self-protection, following the example of countries like North Korea and Russia. This shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East could lead to significant changes in the future.

Hi, everyone. Ed demarsh here. Please take two seconds to hit like, follow, share down below and Also check out trendsjournal.com for the world’s best trend forecast you won’t get anywhere else. That’s trendsjournal.com Thanks a lot. Hello, my name is Edmund DeMarsh with the Trends Journal. I’m happy to be with Matt Ho today. He’s the senior fellow from Eisenhower Media Network. Matt, thank you so much for joining the Trends Journal. Thanks so much for having me join you. I was just telling you that I always enjoy watching you on Judge Napolitano and Dialogue Works. It’s a, it’s a treat to be talking with you today.

So thank you. Oh, thank you. I appreciate that. I want to get right into what the key topic seems to be in everyone’s mind, Iran right now. And I saw you just posted a little while before getting on with me now about some of the reasons why this might be a huge topic right now, why war with Iran seems almost imminent. And you posted that it’s no coincidence this is on X. It’s no coincidence this potential war on Iran is coinciding with Israel’s annexations of the west bank or actions to annex the West Bank. You wrote, for Israel, the West bank has always been the primary goal.

Operations, campaigns and wars throughout the region need to be understood as support, supporting or shaping efforts by the Israelis for West bank annexation. Even the genocide in Gaza can be understood that way. War with Iran, whether to achieve regime change or induce a civil war is necessary to remove support from Palestinians as well as distract from the annexation itself and tie the Americans into the campaign. It seems, Matt, that that’s something that a lot of Americans don’t really know what’s happening in the West Bank. So can you go a little bit further in why you see some ties between what the IDF is doing and settlers are doing in the west bank against the Palestinians to this almost Greater Israel project that almost seems to be unfolding right now for everyone to see.

Yeah, thanks. I, I, I, I’m happy, you know, again, to be speaking with you and that what you just quoted me there on is certainly not the only explanation for this, you know, coming, this potentially coming war on Iran. There are many different fathers and mothers for it. And so, you know, there’s some, certainly not a singular explanation as to why the United States, Israel and parties in Europe as well, are eager for this war. And it certainly has been a war long wanted, but with this aspect of it, this, this reality that you cannot divorce a war on Iran or let alone any other operations, campaigns, wars throughout the Middle east that we’ve seen the last few years, but even over the last decades from the Israelis, operations to achieve their goal of Greater Israel.

So the idea of Greater Israel being the control, either de facto or de jure, of all the Palestinian Lands, parts of Southern Lebanon, parts of Syria, sometimes, you know, include the Sinai as well, you know, essentially what you saw occur, so say 1967, and the conquest of those territories and lands by the Israelis, you know, so you, you’ve had this desire by the Israelis to finish what was started, say in 1948. And you’ll hear that commentary, you’ll hear that type of argument put forward by not fringe actors in Israel, but by sitting Israeli ministers. You’ll hear people like the Finance Minister, Bezel Smotrich, or you’ll hear people like Inamar Ben Gavir, the National Security Minister, say things along those lines is that we didn’t do the job right in 48, we stopped too soon.

Right? And then of course, you know, the explanation for the 67 war was the desire on Israeli’s part to finish that, to finish that territorial conquest. You know, so this has been something that has been resident within the Israeli vision of Greater Israel for decades upon decades. The idea of how these other nations then factor into it in this idea that war on Iran would be a supporting effort or a shaping effort for Israeli annexation of the West Bank. Well, the idea in that is that what you need to have occur in order for the Israelis to actually annex the west bank, to finalize it, is an isolation of the west bank from anyone who can support it.

Right. Whether that’s materially, militarily, Militarily, you know, that’s a very far fetched idea. But political support, moral support, diplomatic support, economic support, whatever you want. The Israelis want to isolate the west bank as much as possible as well as to. If your main objective is the west bank, you want to clear out any obstacles to that before you actually begin that. So you can thoroughly concentrate on your primary objective, you can thoroughly concentrate on your annexation efforts. So say, in the case of, say, Lebanon, the Israelis don’t want to fully proceed with annexation of the west bank until they feel that the question regarding Lebanon has been resolved, that Hezbollah has been neutralized, that there is a buffer between Israel and Hezbollah, that Israel controls enough of southern Lebanon to essentially dictate what occurs there.

They can manage the airspace there, they can manage the ground. And this prevents any efforts by Hezbollah to put pressure on Israel from the north that could disrupt the Israel’s campaign to annex the West Bank. I mean, we have to understand that a campaign to annex the west bank will be a harsher reality than what we saw in any of the intifadas, either the first or second intifada in terms of the Israeli military presence that’s going to be required on the ground throughout the West Bank. So the Israelis want to basically clear the way for this operation.

So in order to do that, you need to take care of any of the other obstacles, any of the actors out there, anything that could interfere, again, either provide direct support to the Palestinians or provide support by, say again with the Lebanon example, putting pressure on Israel from the north to make it so that Israel cannot concentrate fully on the West Bank. And so you can make that argument for Lebanon, you can make that argument for Syria, for Iraq, for Yemen, Egypt, of course that was accomplished, you know, decades ago. But you know, and then now the last one standing essentially is Iran.

I mean, what we’ve seen happen, Eddie, over the last two and a half years is the United States and Israel successfully destroy or degrade or neutralize or quiet the axis of resistance. One by one, the Israel, Israel with the United States have effectively disabled the various points or fingers or elements of that axis of resistance. So you look at Lebanon in 2024, at the end of 2024, you see the successful overthrow of Bashar Assad, a project that had been worked on for 15 years. You see in Iraq the quantum quieting or the neutralization of the Iraqi Shia militias, the popular mobilization forces, you know, essentially shut down, not shut down, but essentially muzzled, not able to carry out attacks or strikes against Israel in support of the Palestinians as they were doing late 2022, 2023.

Yemen is the notable exception where the Yemenis, Ansar Allah or the Houthis have not been defeated, they’ve not been degraded. The United States sentenced Navy twice into the Red Sea to defeat the Houthis. And both times the Americans had a settle for a face saving truth that was essentially an American retreat from the Red Sea. And so the last, last pillar here, the last thing that needs to be addressed before you fully take on the west bank is, and I should say, you know, God help me for saying this right, but the genocide in Gaza has, you know, you can argue that that has been a supporting or a shaping effort for west bank annexation, that you can’t move on to the west bank, you can’t concentrate into the west bank until you take care of the Gaza Hamas, Palestinian, Islamic Jihad problem, et cetera.

Right. You know, so Iran is this last pillar that needs to be addressed. And, and, you know, this is a prime factor, a prime reason for this potential war on Iran. Again, there are other reasons for it. Right, right. But this is a major aspect that American, American military, by taking part or by conducting this war on Iran, will be essentially conducting a supporting effort to allow for the Israelis to fully begin their efforts to annex the West Bank. Because this will, this war on Iran will isolate the west bank and it will also serve as distraction.

No one’s be paying attention to the Israelis in the west bank when the United States is killing scores upon scores of Iranians every day and missiles are flying back and forth, you know, and so on. That’s one of the things that’s interesting to me is when Trump was running for President back in 2020, he was endorsed by some of Israel’s top settlers, like Itmar Ben gvir, the head of the national security for Israel. But how do you square this? The Trump administration said that it is clearly opposed to the annexation of the West Bank. That’s the policy position that the Trump administration has said.

So if I was a spokesperson from the administration, I would tell you, what are you talking about? We’re opposed to an annexation of the West Bank. We’re not for that. We want the Abraham Accords to take place. We want Saudi Arabia to join, join these Abraham Accords. They’re not going to do it, or at least they said they won’t do it if, if it’s, if there’s any issues with the West Bank. So how does the Trump administration play this? Because they said that annexations. They’re opposed to. Right. No, that, that’s a really good point. And some of this is that I think many of the Americans may be unwitting.

You know, I doubt that’s the case for the senior levels of leadership here, particularly those that are Zionists themselves, which is a large chunk of the foreign policy establishment in Washington, D.C. whether they be Republicans or Democrats. But this aspect, it may just be an issue of semantics for them, and it may just be a way of the Israelis conditioning the Israelis, massaging this to make it appear as anything other than annexation. So the way they’ve gone about it now is. Or the way they’re beginning about is they’re carrying out this land registration process, something that the Israelis stopped back in 1967.

And this allows for the very specious or disingenuous argument to be made that, look, the Israelis are actually Just, just doing what’s legally required. They’re conducting land registration. And what they’re finding is that the Palestinians don’t actually own this land, that this is vacant land or empty land. And so Israel is taking it over as state property, which, you know, they’ll make the argument that this falls underneath their, this falls underneath their purview according to the Oslo Accords, because this land registration that the Israelis are using to annex the massive amounts of the west bank fall into what’s called Area C, which is the area that the mostly rural parts of the West bank makes up 60 or 70% of the west bank, if I ever call Prop.

I think it is. Yeah, yeah, but like, but this area, Area C. So Oswald Accords established areas A, B and C. Areas A are the urban centers of the west bank that are fully controlled by the Palestinian Authority Authority. Areas B are areas outside those urban areas, you know, townships, villages that the Palestinian Authority has some control over, but the Israeli military essentially is in charge. And you have Area C where there’s no Palestinian Authority presence at all. These are the areas. Area C is where most of the settlements have gone into. But essentially the idea being is that the argument will be made is that, look, this is land that wasn’t registered, this land was not owned by anybody.

And so Israel is just fulfilling out its duties under the Oslo Accord to manage this land and they’re taking control of it again in accordance with the Oslo. They’ll make some type of argument like that, Eddie, or they’ll make an argument that, look, no, Abbas is still in Ramallah, there’s still a Palestinian Authority, right? There’ll be some type of figurehead there. And then of course, the whole question of Palestinian statehood will be something that will be continued to be trotted out as some aspirational goal. And so though essentially this whole idea that the Israelis have been moving through under the last few decades of the Oslo Accords has been this idea of facts on the ground, right? Make it so that there is an increasing Israeli presence through settlers, right? So since Oslo, you’ve seen the settler population grow by what, about a half a million? I think there are about 200, 250,000 settlers 30 some odd years ago, and now there’s about 700, 750,000 settlers, you know, and that fact on the ground establishes Israeli control no matter what the diplomatic paperwork has to say about it, or no matter what international law has to say about it.

So I think what you’ll get is just arguments over semantics from this administration, any administration that secedes, this administration, whether it be Republican or Democrat, will go along with it. Just as, say, the Biden administration went along with the move of the embassy from the American Embassy that, that Donald Trump in his first term conducted the move of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Joe Biden and his people didn’t move the embassy back. They’ll just accept it. Right. And I, so I think that is what you’re looking at here. And will the Palestinian flag ever come down over Mala? I don’t know.

I don’t think so. I think what you’re looking at here in the sense of what the Israelis plan for annexation would be, is to take these rural areas and then to slowly start squeezing the more the towns and the villages, forcing people into the urban areas. And then essentially what you’ll have, you’ll have seven, maybe eight urban areas in the west bank that are isolated, that they’re, they’re essentially the, the, the, the, these contaminants of Palestinian populations that are isolated from one another. And essentially they’ll be under siege. And the Israelis will just have those Palestinian urban areas die on the vine, if you will.

And the idea being is that they will forcibly push people into those areas and it’ll become unlivable and they will try and make every, make the conditions possible that these people will leave on their own. And then eventually you’ll have some type of emergency situation like October 7th that will allow for a military, military ethnic cleansing like what we saw occur in Gaza. And so I think that is kind of the mindset here. The Israelis are not in a rush about this. They understand the opportunity. They understand that this last two and a half years has presented them with the best opportunity since 1967 to achieve their objectives, and they are carrying that out.

But if you recall, when Donald Trump visited Israel, was it November or so, whenever he was in Israel? And at that time, the Knesset passed a law saying that we’re going to annex the West Bank. And the Trump administration was furious about that. And the Israelis were themselves also furious because those who had a, and a lot of the way to read that bill passed was because a lot of members of the Knesset abstained. Right? They knew politically they couldn’t vote for this. But spiritually, doctrinally, ideologically, this is where their hearts were. But a lot of the Knesset members abstained.

And their anger at the far right, that advances annexation bill was essentially, yes, we want the annexation too, but you’re doing this the wrong way. You’re rushing it, and you’re being abrupt and you’re being hasty and you’re being loud and aggressive about it. And that’s not the way to do, to do it slow and steady, subtly, calmly, day by day, we will take it and eventually it’ll all be ours. If you make a scene out of it, you’re more than likely to have backlash from the Americans and the Europeans and then we’ll be set back. So they really see the opportunity.

The last two and a half years, they’ve advanced on it throughout the region, right, with this campaign, military campaigns one after another that have by and by been successful. And they’ve seceded in taking half of the Gaza Strip, forcing the entire population of Gaza into what, about 45% of pre2023 Gaza. And they have completely immiserated that population. You know, I mean, so they see themselves as achieving their goals slowly but steadily. So I don’t think there’s a rush other than the idea that we need to take advantage of this opportunity but be smart about it. You mentioned before, and we know that Iran is the main backer for or at least a supporter of the Palestinian cause.

I mean, I think from what happened, at least militarily, the Houthis were the biggest defenders of the Palestinians from what we saw unfold. And even in the beginning, Hezbollah, they stepped it up too during the genocide’s earlier time with strikes into. They said there wouldn’t be peace in Israel or the genocide, but then Israel really went to work on the civilian population in Beirut and things like that. So my question is, could Iran have done more to protect the Palestinians and prevent a genocide? The only time Iran has responded to Israel was after really attacks on Iran on the.

I think there was an attack on the diplomatic outpost or embassy in Syria. And then obviously after the 12 Day War was the big one. But if I’m a Palestinian, do I think that Iran really does have my best interest in heart? And I wouldn’t even blame them if they don’t. I understand that Iran wants to remain a country too, but do you think you. Do you think Iran is that that bulwark against, for the Palestinians that at least is presented? Yeah, that was certainly the image, Eddie, that was being presented by Iran over the last decades.

I mean, going back to certainly its early days with its revolutionary government in the early 80s, you know, its role in helping Hezbollah become the organization that it became as a defender of southern Lebanon from occupation, you know, and so Iran has always presented itself that way. And I think there’s a lot of disappointment over these last couple years with Iran with the larger axis of resistance, again the ability of the US and Israel to essentially take the axis of resistance on one by one and neutralize it that way, you know, so very, very, very much the analogy, right, or of, of taking on a fist versus individual fingers.

So I think there’s disappointment, not just in Palestine about that. I don’t want to say think I know I was, I was there in the west bank in November of 2024. So I know there’s disappointment with that though. It’s a disappointment that’s reasoned right. Kind of as you said, it’s understandable. It’s not, you know, I don’t think there are Palestinians saying Iran should have launched into a war that they would have lost on Palestine’s behalf. I mean, I think they understand it. But the disappointment of there not being that bulwark of there not being that shield or that protector through Iran and the axis of resistance that they thought that might have been the Lebanese, I think the same way, certainly Israel’s destruction, the carrying out of its Tahia doctrine.

Right. So it’s mass slaughter of civilians, essentially carrying out a military campaign against civilians in Lebanon to. It also carried out an effective military campaign against Hezbollah, not on the ground, but from the air. But you know, I mean, so there’s that disappointment in Lebanon as well. The expectation that the Iranians were going to join in and help us. It didn’t materialize. Now, the Houthis or Ansar Allah Yemen certainly did. And they are the, they are the great exception. They are the only ones who have stood up for the Palestinians, I think in any way that history will deem honorable.

But, you know, I mean, you’re looking at what actually is the capacity of the Iranians here? Do they actually have the wherewithal to fight a war against the United States and Israel? We’ve seen three battles essentially between the US And Israel and Iran. As you said, the Iranians responded after their diplomatic post was struck in Syria. They responded as well after Ismail Hanaya, the Hamas envoy, was assassinated in Tehran. And of course, you had the 12 day war last June between the Iranians and the Israelis with the late. While the Americans were always fully involved in that, but not intensive strikes into Iran until at the very end, which, you know, I mean, there’s, there’s a lot of ways to interpret that.

I fall in the camp that that strike by the Americans was a way to save face and get that war over with because the Americans and the Israelis were running out of Missile defense interceptors that they were running out of the ability to shoot down the incoming Iranian missiles and drones. And so that the war had a come to an end and Donald Trump sent in the B2s. It was a whole lot of theater, right, and it was a, an excuse. There is a rationalization there. There is an argument that, hey, it’s over now. I obliterated the nuclear complexes.

We don’t have to continue this thing going any further. And the Iranians as well, I think, were happy to end it at that point too. They didn’t press it, right? They were. And essentially as well, when the Israelians retaliate against the Americans for that B2 strike, it’s against the American air base in Qatar and the Israel. And excuse me, the Iranians give the Israelis a heads up, something that the Israelis did not do themselves when the Israelis attacked Qatar, you know, later that year. So, you know, I mean, so, but, but that’s all to say what actually is the real capacity here of Iran? You know, I mean, we were told, or many of us were under the impression, and the learned authorities on this had us all believing that Hezbollah had hundreds of thousands of missiles and drones and rockets and that failed to materialize.

You know, and so, you know, what is actually Iran’s capabilities and capacities, we can measure it a bit off of what we saw in the 12 Day War. Iran did have success hitting Israeli air bases. It did hit the parts of urban areas where the IDF has their command and control bunkers buried underground. It was able to hit those. Whether it had any effect, we don’t know. And we simply don’t know the amount of missiles that they have. We hear estimates that they’re building anywhere from 300 to 3,000amonth, but none of us know. I say the only thing I know for certain about this coming war with Iran, Eddie, is that anyone who tells you how, who, who is certain about how it will end, that person is wrong.

That’s the only thing I’m certain about because there’s so much uncertain here. So I think your question’s a really good one about where was Iran over the last two and a half years as the genocide in Gaza was occurring? I mean, if, if the axis of resistance to broaden it was not going to step in and protect the Palestinians during that genocide, then when were they ever going to act? And of course, Yemen being the, notably the Houthis being the notable exception. Hezbollah of course did launch rocket and drone attacks into northern Israel. They actually sent a drone to try and hit Netanyahu’s personal resonance at one point, right? Yeah, but, but, but it didn’t have, and it had an effect on Israel in the sense that it forced Israel to keep soldiers in the north.

It forced 150,000 Israelis to evacuate their homes. So it had a good effect on the Iranian, excuse me, the Israeli economy, but it didn’t have any effect on impacting the genocide. And then once Israel began its operations fully against Hezbollah, it was rather a quick and ugly affair. You know, we could say the same about the Shia militias, the popular mobilization forces in Iraq. As soon as the United States leaned on the Iraqi government and the Iraqi government jerked the chain, the popular mobilization forces became very quiet. You know, the militia forces became very quiet. So, I mean, it is, it’s a good question.

I think we’re getting to the point now where we’re two and a half years past October 7th, were able to view some of this with some history and some hindsight in mind. And I think it’s a fair thing to evaluate what we thought we understood, what the expectations were and what was actually delivered. And this is all, as you were saying, this is understandable why Iran didn’t throw itself into a war against Israel and the United States because it would have invited exactly the thing that many in the US And Israel were hoping for. They were looking for the opportunity for that war.

So why give your opponent, your adversary, exactly what they want when they want it? You know, I mean, remember that Iran was not prepared for October 7th. They had no role in it. They were unaware. So it wasn’t as if the, the in Tehran, they have been preparing themselves and steadying themselves and readying themselves for what might come. They were just as blindsided on October 7th as the rest of us were. So, but yeah, I think it’s a, it’s a really good point to look at, particularly those of us who commentate on this, those of us who analyze it, whether we had been objective enough, whether or not we are sources that we’re using were reliable enough, whether or not we are letting our own biases or wishes, you know, interfere with our analysis, I think that’s a good thing for all of us who do this kind of work now to be engaging in.

Not that we have much time for that because, you know, this war in Iran, it might be. What time is it now? It’s, we’re taping at 3:45. So it’s, it’s past midnight in the Gulf. So as far as we know, the war could have started already. I have my own theory. I think if the war starts, it might be after the Winter Olympics, which I think is like in four days. Because remember that one war that when they had the Beijing Olympics and, and there was a deal, Russia made a deal with Beijing and not to go into Ukraine until after the Olympics.

I’m like, is this going to be round two of those kind of deals? Yeah, absolutely. I, I think there’s, well, I mean, as far as I know, the Ford hasn’t gotten to the Mediterranean yet. So I don’t think they’ll do anything until the Fords there. So she can provide air cover over Israel. And that’s something that’s interesting here, right? Is the Houthis role in all this? The Houthis do it, they make it impossible, it seems, for the Ford to go through the Suez Canal to join the Lincoln in the Arabian Sea. Right. And as well as US Naval forces in the region, they now have to contend with Iranian forces to their north or east, however you want to orient them as well as then Houthi forces from their west, you know, and again, as well, the Houthis, I don’t think the Americans will put the Ford through the Suez and have her go through the Red Sea.

I mean, so you see that the role the Houthis have played in here. And again, I think if we’re going to analyze this and take stock of what has occurred, I think that the Houthis are the ones that come out with the most honor and all this and also too have had the most effect because, you know, their role in this is still quite a strong one. And I think their impact on any potential war in Iran is something that’s not being addressed at all. And, you know, at what point then is the American Navy able to fight both Yemen and Iran, particularly if this thing drags on for months? You know, the, the whole aspect of this is crazy because the political objectives seem to be either regime change in Iran or the creation of the conditions so that Iran falls into a state like Syria was, right.

10, 12, 13 years ago. And what if those aren’t achieved? You’re just going to keep bombing, you’re just going to keep carrying out missile strikes, just trying to stir the pot in Iran and make it that these sectarian uprisings happen and you force a civil war to occur, is that, you know, and how long can you do that for? We saw that the Americans couldn’t fight the Houthis by themselves for more than two months at a time without having to, you know, again, getting to some type of face saving truce and then retreat. So, you know, there’s a lot of uncertainty with this and that’s again, the only thing I’m certain of is anyone who tells you how this is going to end, I don’t think they know what they’re talking about.

It’s confusing because it seems like the Trump administration doesn’t know how it’s going to end because presumably if Trump thought that Iran really was, if the leadership in Iran really was on the ropes, wouldn’t we already be bombing them yesterday? And we’re using regime, going for a regime change now. And also it strikes me that, you know, I remember Venezuela, remember, you know, some analysts were saying that, oh, this we can get bogged down in another Vietnam style mess boondoggle. Venezuela is not. Maduro’s not going to fall easy. They have a million man militia. This is going to be a disaster.

And yet it looks like that worked out at least for right now, pretty easily for the US The American, the American four star General Donovan, who just took over South Southern Command is actually in Venezuela right now. Right. John Ratcliffe, the head of the CIA went to Venezuela. Radcliffe was the first one to go. You know, it’s incredible how that happened. So it’s like, you know, will they conduct, like you mentioned before, you know, will they conduct a quick hit and try to kill top leadership in Iran and, and then hope that there’s a quick uprising and, and that’s the end of the story.

And then the, you know, you know, and two things that come out of the Maduro kidnapping. One is that both things worry me. One is that how much confidence did that kidnapping give to the American administration? Right. How hubris. Almost like hubris. Exactly. Right, right. You know, like who’s going to stop us kind of thing. And then the other aspect of it then is, all right, if they’re able to plan that and carry that off, what else are they capable of? So, you know, we have to respect, again, this is why, you know, you have to respect the successes of Israel in the United States through the region, taking apart essentially the axis of resistance one by one.

You know, I hate to say it, but they did a good job with that, you know, and they were successful. And now, you know, Iran stands alone. The Palestinians are essentially isolated. Hezbollah has been neutralized. Syria was overthrown. You haven’t heard anything from the Iraqi militias in years now. Right. It seems like, so what are they capable then of doing? Particularly if you saw their ingenuity in taking Maduro, you know, not just the, the tactical aspects of putting Delta Force in there and killing 100 people and et cetera, but no, actually the political aspects of understanding Venezuela enough to apply that leverage to co op people, to coerce people, to bribe people, whatever they had to do to make it so that, yeah, we’re going to steal your president, we’re going to kidnap him, and then our CA director is going to come visit you in a few days and you’re going to kiss the ring and, and then you’re going to open up your oil industry to our companies.

And yeah, if you want to mouth off and say how you’re resisting us, go ahead, we don’t care, because we know what’s really going on here. You know, we’ll allow you the space, actually, Delsey, to make these statements so that you can save face in all this or at least try and recant, try and keep some type of political capital here, you know, I mean, so you look at it that way and you say, shit, I don’t know if you can curse. Are you serious? If you watch Gerald’s program, this is rated G. This is fine.

Are you kidding, right? Welcome to the family. Welcome to the family. If they could do that, what could they do elsewhere? You know, and I know Iran is completely different from Venezuela. I get that. But, you know, you do have to respect their capabilities, however much it hurts you to do so, because they have been successful. Now, you can measure that against things that have not been successful. Again, like I keep going back to the, the loss in the Red Sea, but even to the, the campaign in Ukraine, you know, the ability of the United States to manufacture munitions so that where the United States industry to provide for and support the American military, the rough shape that the American Navy and Air Force are in, in terms of their size, in terms of how diminished their capabilities are because of maintenance issues, right? I mean, our leadership, just the generals and admirals who, who, who, who directed the Ukrainians in 2023 in that catastrophic offensive, the Americans were behind that.

Right? I mean, so you could point these things and say, okay, there’s some really, really dangerous aspects of American military performance. Americans, their ability to sustain themselves as well as their resources that make me believe. This is what I get back to our saying before, about how long is this going to last for? You know, so, yeah, of course the United States can destroy a lot, we can kill a lot, we can bomb a lot of Iranian military targets and infrastructure, and we could, if not assassinate their political leaders, drive them underground. We can do that.

In concert with cyber attacks, sabotage we’ve been carrying out there for years. And then we could try and tie that into sectarian uprisings, you know, and I think that’s what the plan is. But how long can they sustain that for? How long can they carry out that campaign? And over looking at, back in the last couple decades, what campaign of the American military has achieved the political objectives that have been set out before it? You know, none, essentially. Yeah. You know, the ones that were successful I was talking about, you got to give most of the credit to the Israelis on that, you know, and even in Syria, where that’s a mixed bag of success, you got to give most of it, maybe the Turks.

Yeah. I mean, so yeah, it’s, it’s, it’s one of those things where the uncertainty is so great in this, that’s all the reason itself, not for this war to be carried out. Matt, my last question for you and again, I’m going to have all your information down below. I suggest everyone following Matt on X for great up to the minute posts, my last question is back to Iran. If Saudi Arabia is watching this war unfold, let’s assume that the US does go to war with Iran and Saudi Arabia is sitting there. Would Saudi Arabia be concerned if Israel has its way with Iran and begins to get even stronger in the region? Like we always talk about how the Saudis and Iran, they’re at their head ends a lot.

They don’t get along as well as they could. But do you think there’s worry in the region, even allies, even these Gulf states that are allied with Israel? Do you think there’s concern that a downed Iran would make Israel almost insurmountable in the region? And should these countries be aware of that or is that something that they would want for stability? I think, you know, the Saudis have moved past this idea that Iran is their rival. I mean, it’s still always going to exist. But you certainly had this detente that’s occurred over the last couple years.

You’ve seen the Saudis clearly say in the last weeks that we don’t want any part in this war and we don’t want, you know, we’re not going to take part. We don’t want the Americans to use our bases. I don’t know how, what, how much that will be carried, you know, will be listened to or how that will work. But, you know, certainly what you’re getting to there, Eddie, about this, why wouldn’t the Saudis be next? Why wouldn’t the Emiratis or the Qataris be next. I think that they feel that they have a modus viande, right? These, these, these particularly those three states, have this agreement, this relationship with Israel because of their relationship with the United States.

That prevents them from being treated the same way or prevents them from eventually sharing the same fate or being cast in the same role that Iran has been cast in for decades. But, you know, there’s a couple of things to argue against that, you know, one, every empire and, or every hegemon needs to have a rival. You need it for your own narrative’s sake, right? And so for Israel and for the Americans, the Iranians have fulfilled that role quite strongly. Right. For the last many decades. So if you don’t have that villain in your story, who’s it going to be then? I mean, you saw that with the US following then in the Cold War, that angst we went through, overwrite that identity crisis of, of that, you know, who’s against us, who is our enemy now? Because that’s how we have to define ourselves, is by who we are against our, our, our construct, our narrative of that, of a struggle of mannequin, a mannequin struggle of good versus evil.

You know, you need to have somebody standing in that evil role. So there’s always that danger. But this idea that the Gulf monarchies are going to continue to have a special place and that they’ll be exempt from the rules that are put on the rest of the region is. Yeah, that. That’s a really, that’s a really a tenuous one. I think, you know, I think that those states have a special relationship with Donald Trump that they have not had with previous American presidents. So I think that the Qataris, the Emiratis and the Saudis have a relationship with the US that they view as stronger.

And you can point to things such as, say, the Qatari American Security alliance, right, Those type that, you know what, that Donald Trump issued through executive order. You know, you can point to those types of things, but how long could that last for? And that’s why I think you’re seeing things where they are eager to establish themselves. The way Saudi Arabia has conducted itself in Yemen over the last couple months, evicting the Emiratis, essentially firmly establishing control in southern Yemen, essentially trying to shut down the SD Southern Transitional Council there. Right. So taking control of Yemen as much as it can.

The Emiratis, of course, are involved throughout the region in ways different than the Saudis, but they’re still heavily involved. So you see the Emiratis, the relationship with the RSF in Sudan, their relationship with Somaliland. I mean, trying to essentially create conditions where they have anchors or points throughout the region that are supportive of them as well as that they can fall back onto in a virtual sense. You know, I mean, so, but you’re also seeing, you know, I just said the, the Qatari American relationship, but you’re seeing reports more and more of this Pakistani, Saudi, Turkish relationship.

Sometimes the Egyptians are put into there. You know, one thing is made clear, I think, to these states as they’ve watched the last couple years unfold is that they’ve been helpless to intervene. So say the Turks really did, say Erdogan really did want to intervene and stop the genocide in Gaza. That’s certainly what his rhetoric said. He was never going to do it. He was never going to put F16s in the air to shoot down Israeli planes. And he’s made the same comments about Lebanon and he was never going to put F16s over Beirut to protect the Lebanese.

But you know, this impotency that I think many of these states have felt over the last couple years, I think the understanding of the realization that you can’t trust the United States. And so now I think you’re going to see a shifting in the region geopolitically to establish relationships, if not alliances that will protect these countries. Because getting back to what we were saying originally, if the US and Israel are successful with Iran, then what’s to stop you from being next? So I, I think the, the, the, the, the tenuous kind of tightrope that say the Saudis have walked with the Israelis over the last many years.

How long can that go on for? Right? I mean, so I, I think you’ll see this desire through alliances, through relationships, but also too, finally, I’ll say, I think the idea of a nuclear armed Turkey or nuclear armed Saudi Arabia is something that’s a real possibility. Why shouldn’t it be, right? Why, why should MBS or why should Erdogan be looking at the region, understanding his limitations, not having a nuclear weapons capability and always realizing that he will be able to be dominated by the Israelis if need be. So I think there is that, that, that, that, that, that potential reality too of, of, of a proliferation in the Middle East? Because why wouldn’t they, after these last couple of years, wouldn’t you do the same or wouldn’t you consider it, I think is a good way to look at it.

Every country, if I’m a country, I would want nuclear weapons. Look at Kim Jong Un. He’s still sitting there. Putin is still fine. Having nuclear weapons seems to assure you you’re, you’re going to be okay. Right. But Matt Ho, senior fellow at the Eisenhower Media Network, thank you so much for joining the Trench Journal. Thank you, Eddie.
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