The prevalent intelligence assessment that Iran’s frozen ITS program since 2003 is completely dead wrong. They have one of the largest nuclear capable ballistic missile programs in the world. The whole idea that their religion bans them from having nuclear weapons is just patently ridiculous. Iran, North Korea, Russia and China likely all have super EMPs in orbit that they could detonate at the push of a button. We’re in this doom loop where we’re creating the very existential threats that wouldn’t otherwise exist without our provocative actions. I think worst case scenario is we have a super EMP satellite detonation over the U.S.

if the civilian grid goes down, the military bases go down as well. I’m very skeptical as to whether the US government would be able to survive a super EMP event or anything of that nature. If we see the talks break down, I think that’s going to be a major red flag that World War three is on the menu again where it could escalate to the nuclear level. World War three is already happening. This is a house of cars and it is in the process of collapsing right now. You’re going to see an economic crash the likes of which we’ve never.

Hi folks, Canadian prepper here today on the channel we have David Pine, a former US Army Combat Arms and HQ staff officer with an MA in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He currently serves as Deputy Director of National Operations for the EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security. And I think the last time we spoke it was probably sometime after October 7th, I believe that sounds about right. It’s been over a year, about a year and a half. So we got potentially a couple other wars starting here. So I want to first off ask you because obviously top of mind at this point in time is what’s happening in the Middle East.

Just to contextualize this interview, we just came off a diplomatic meeting between some high ranking Iranian officials in indirect talks with Steve Witkoff in Oman. Now you have a, I wouldn’t want to say a controversial point of view on this, but it’s of your belief that Iran possesses nuclear weapons. Now what do you base that on? And could you maybe talk a little bit about that and how that fits into the negotiations and where you see this going? Yeah, absolutely. Thanks again for having me on your show. So Dr. Peter Pry, who is the executive director and really the founding leader of our task force and National Homeland Security, he wrote an article 2012, actually wrote several 2012, 16 I think, 2021 as well, in which he, former CIA director James Woolsey and the former director of, I think the Missile Defense Agency all assessed that Iran had, was three months away from, you know, nuclear weaponization technology in 2003.

And that. But with all, I mean, with all likelihood, they likely had developed nuclear weapons by, you know, 2012 or 2016 at the latest. And I mean, the whole idea that you, Iran is this deadly threat, you know, a terrorist nation, but they’re so peaceful, they, their religion bans them from having nuclear weapons is just patently ridiculous. The whole concept of Western intelligence that they somehow suspended their nuclear weapons program in 2003 is, it’s just really absurd. And you know, no nation, you know, with a regime like Iran’s would self limit themselves in that ways, particularly when they live in an environment in which, you know, the US Is kind of bullying other countries around, threatening Iran with, you know, massive strikes as, as President Trump is doing against their nuclear program.

That’s just a really powerful incentive for, you know, for them to, you know, develop nuclear weapons. But yeah, it was, it was after Peter Price technical assessment that they had the technology were extremely close. And I remember, you know, 15 years ago hearing that they were days away from developing nuclear weapons. So the idea that, you know, that, that they’re, they haven’t done that yet is, is just really very difficult for any credible national security analyst to believe. Yeah, I guess now, I mean, I do recall rhetoric of that sort at that point in time. I mean, I guess now they, they’ve demonstrated that they have uranium at a certain level of enrichment which is now verified, which I suppose moves them even closer to some tangible nuclear weaponry.

But so I guess it’s, it’s largely, we’re still within the realm of speculation then as to whether or not they genuinely have a nuclear weapon. I mean, it would seem that they, they should. You know, if they’re looking at what happens to countries who don’t. And I agree with you that the ban on nuclear weaponry is probably just a ruse. I don’t genuinely believe that they would let something like that restrict them from something which was so essential for their national security. But do you think that this is part of the reason why they’ve yet to definitively strike Iran in any meaningful way up until this point.

Or is it more related to Iran’s ability to launch a conventional response? Well, we know that the, you know, way back to George H.W. or George W. Bush, his administration, you know, refused to allow Israeli strikes to, you know, have the friend or FO codes necessary to, you know, conduct a strike over Iraqi airspace, you know, circumventing Iraqi aerospace to hit Iran. That seemingly went away with the Biden administration. So there’s been nothing to restrict Israel from directly targeting Iran’s nuclear program. And indeed, the Israeli strikes recently, just last year, they were in response to a massive Iranian missile attack on Israel, did target some of the air defense radars that could be a precursor to such an attack.

So, you know, I can’t really answer the question as to why, you know, those strikes haven’t occurred since, you know, the US seemingly lifted Israeli, you know, restrictions on Israel to conduct those strikes. But, you know, it doesn’t seem, it seems irrational to me to do, to be discussing those types of strikes this, at this late hour. You know, in 2003, I was calling for the, for those kind of strikes because I viewed Iran as the primary threat, not Iraq. And so I was calling on the US not to evade Iran, of course, but just to conduct a massive bombing campaign in retaliation to their alleged supportive of, you know, Al Qaeda, their nuclear program and other things.

So yeah, I just. Very dangerous at this point. Even if they don’t have nuclear weapons, you think that they’re so potentially close to doing so that this would only antagonize them into using said nuclear weapons and that they’re already beyond the, the Rubicon of being a threshold state. So at this point, all they can do is really negotiate because the risk then would be that Iran would have the capability to put nuclear weapons on Israel or on critical targets throughout the Middle east. And this would essentially limit the United States. This would be a deterrent. Yeah, that’s exactly right.

So if it’s true that we believe that they’re days, if not hours away from developing a nuclear weapon, the idea that we would give them a 60 day window, a 60 day ultimatum, you know, to prepare for, you know, US strikes and their nuclear program, that’s all the time they need to, you know, weaponize. You know, they reportedly have sufficient enriched uranium for four nuclear bombs. I would assess that they, that’s the minimum they have. They likely have dozens. And they certainly have, we know they have IRBMs that are operational as possible. I mean, they certainly have ICBM technology.

They’ve demonstrated that with space launch, space launches of, you know, super EMP capable satellites. Both Tommy Waller and myself, Tommy Waller being the CEO of the center for Security Policy, wrote articles a couple of years ago assessing that the NOR 2 and NORTH 3 Iranian satellites orbiting at an altitude of 285 miles overhead. That’s, that’s the optimum, you know, EMP strike altitude for, you know, a strike against the, the center of the continental United States. So that was a big red flag for us. So they have weapons already. Just so people are, are aware you’re against the war in Iran.

You are outspoken in your criticisms of people of the neoconservative Ilkin agenda. But don’t you think the speculation that Iran has nukes gives credence to the Israeli war hawks view that we need to go in there and intervene? I mean, obviously they’d be ready. They would presumably anticipate that there would be a response. But like, I guess I’m trying to reconcile your perspective that, okay, you’re against any sort of military intervention in Iran, you think it would end in disaster, which I would agree with. But in saying that they have nuclear weapons, wouldn’t that compel them to want to intervene in some way, shape or form, maybe even asymmetrically? Well, in terms of Israel, I mean, Israel’s led by, you know, kind of their own neocon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

So they, they don’t think irrationally. They think in terms of provoking wars and provoking existential threats in the same vein that the Biden regime did. But, you know, President Trump seemingly has gone beyond that, you know, with the exception of Iran. Certainly he’s really de escalated, you know, U.S. tensions with Russia to such an extent that he appears to be prioritizing peaceful relations and security with Russia versus, you know, our previous NATO allies. But I think that a US or an Israeli military strike, particularly against Iranian nuclear sites, would create the very existential threat that we, you know, they’ve been warning against.

I mean, you don’t see a lot of nuclear powers exchanging missile strikes with each other. I mean, certainly there was some border clashes between, you know, China and India, both nuclear powers, very minor from my perspectives, similarly with India and Pakistan. But with the, with that exception, you know, with the exception of the Israeli and Iranian, you know, kind of tipper tat strikes that we saw last year, you know, we really haven’t seen, you know, nuclear powers attack each other and the ramifications of that, of that, you know, direct strikes on a nuclear adversary are pretty, you know, I think they’re pretty obvious.

They, they have retained the capability to respond in, you know, with up to and including a nuclear and super EMP attacks on both the US And Israel. So that’s what, you know, that’s the primary reason I’m opposing, you know, someone who supported attacks on Iran back in 2003 when I was on the US army headquarters staff. I strongly oppose it now because the existential blowback possibility is so extreme. All right, guys. So as some of you know, Canadian Prepper is a fully independent channel. We don’t have sponsors, and we’re beholden to nobody. You can help support us by supporting yourself by gearing up@canadianpreparedness.com I know that in an emergency, having the right gear can make all the difference.

This is why I’ve tested and curated the best preparedness products on the market so that you can be confident and ready for whatever comes your way. Now back to the video. Yeah, well, we’ll chat about Russia in just a moment. What do you make then of the military buildup in the Middle east, particularly at Diego Garcia? Is this for the purpose of a highly anticipated possible ground invasion into Yemen, or is this a sort of Damocles hanging over the head of the Iranians? Yeah, I see. There’s, there’s no possibility of a US Ground invasion of Yemen.

We’ve, you know, chosen to pursue the path under the Trump administration of, you know, all these escalating, almost daily missile strikes against Yemen. Certainly that’s degrading their anti ship capabilities to some extent, but there’s really no possibility of us winning a war, you know, with naval and air power alone against, you know, against a land based, state based threat. Despite the fact that the Houthis only control about 15% of Yemen, including the capital, they have supersonic, you know, Mach 4 capable anti ship missiles of various, various types up up to and including anti ship ballistic missiles.

The very first time that anti ship ballistic missiles have been used in combat is against US Naval vessels in the Red Sea. So that’s, you know, if the, if the Houthis had better targeting capabilities, we would find it very difficult to defend against, you know, Mach 4 anti ship missiles. We don’t even have any supersonic cruise anti ship cruise missiles in our arsenal, let alone anti ship ballistic missiles. There’s a lot of weapons that Iran has in that capacity that the US doesn’t currently possess. And the Navy recently canceled one of its, you know, primary hypersonic missile programs.

And so you think that the operations there are going to be largely limited to airstrikes because I recently heard that there was a tentative plan to try to take over a port. Or are you thinking that it’s largely a aerial campaign? I think it’s largely an aerial campaign. Certainly, you know, there are those kind of options of, you know, a limited military incursion up to including, you know, capturing a port to use as a, as a, both air and sea, sea base against the Houthis. Particularly when much of the Yemeni coastline is not controlled by the Houthis, you know, it’s controlled by opposition forces that are US and Saudi backed.

So, you know, I mean, I guess, I guess there’s always that possibility that we try to, Trump tries to attempt kind of an Afghanistan maneuver where we join, you know, we drop Special Forces and even, you know, regular army forces to, to fight alongside the, you know, what are essentially the Ahmedi rebels against the Houthi government and you know, and try to try to take them out, remove them from power, you know, because if we did, I mean, the chances of them coming back to power I think would be much more, much lower than the Taliban.

But, you know, what is the national interest of doing so? I mean, there’s really very, very little national interest interest in doing so. The Houthis were kind of minding their own business. They were abiding by the terms of a two plus month ceasefire. Even when Israel chose to violate the terms of the ceasefire in Gaza, they did not resume any attacks against Red Sea shipping. And I guess the Trump administration would argue, well, those attacks were imminent. But there’s no evidence of that that I’ve seen. So I do think it’s a mistake to move and particularly when The Trump administration’s DoD guidance is stating that our, you know, our main scenario that we’re supposed to be preparing for is to increase our capabilities both to detour and deter and repel a Chinese invasion or blockade scenario against Taiwan.

We’re using up our precious limited stocks of precision guided munitions, you know, that are naval base that we would run out of within a week of intense combat operations against the Chinese in the western Pacific. Well, I mean, I’ll share my thoughts on that with you in a moment. But you know, something that you said is something that seems lost on a lot of people is that the Yemenis were abiding by a temporary ceasefire and I think they hadn’t fired on a ship in some time. And then all of a sudden we start this massive campaign against the Houthis, I should say not the Yemenis, but you know, that tells you that there’s something going on here that despite all the promises of anti war and you know, we’re going to be, we’re moving towards a new era of non interventionism and all this stuff.

Clearly this was something that wasn’t necessary at that point. You could have made the argument that back when things were going on, unless they’re trying to get rid of them because they know it is expedient towards the end of ultimately going at Iran, now they have to get rid of Hezbollah. They have to get rid, they basically have pacified Syria. They’ve for the most part Hezbollah seems to be at least right now neutered in some capacity or they’re, they’re not actively shooting missiles. The Gaza Strip has been, you know, under an embargo for the longest time.

So they’re effectively out of the game. So now it’s just the Houthis and maybe some Iraqi militias that they’re currently in the process of deal with that are the final steps towards Iran, it would seem. But that’s a point worth emphasizing that I never hear anybody talking about is that they started in on the Houthis after the problem had already been for the most part resolved. Now granted, you know, you could make the argument that, well, that will just flare up again, but only if they were planning on continuing their operations in the Gaza Strip. So they must have a plan to continue that they know that the Houthis are going to continue to be a problem down the road.

Now I guess the question is if they can’t deal with the Houthis who like only control a fraction of Yemen, how is it possible that they’re ever going to put any meaningful dent in a country as, as vast and technologically advanced as Iran? I mean, just common sense would dictate that unless you’re using some unconventional methods like pager attacks times 10, you know, you’re not going to be able to, to exact any sort of meaningful regime change in, in Iran? What are your thoughts on, on how exactly they would go about an operation if you know, you were to steel man the argument that they are in fact playing, getting ready to do something in Iran? Well, you raised a great, a great point in that if, if you were planning a massive bombing strike against Iran, you would want to try to, you know, pacify the Houthis and try to degrade, if not eliminate their anti ship, you know, supersonic anti ship missile capabilities that could, you know, take out, you know, US ships in the Red Sea, both warships and international commercial shipping.

I think that in Syria, I would say that Syria is pacified that that civil war never ended. It’s, you know, it’s still quite hot, but it’s, but I think your point was that, you know, Assad is gone and so Iran’s, you know, direct ally is, is gone. So they’re, they, they had a bridge that went straight from, from Iran all the way to Lebanon. And now that that bridge has been broken because they still control, basically control Iraq through Iranian proxies, you know, with of course, you know, seven different Iranian command at Quds force, Iraqi militias, and then of course, Hezbollah.

But, you know, Hezbollah still has vast amounts of rockets and missiles they could hurl at Israel and, you know, US Ships and the, the eastern med. Mediterranean east of, of Cyprus. So I, I wouldn’t say that they’re, they’re pacified. I think that they’ve, they’ve been instructed not to provoke further strikes by, by Iran. But, you know, that’s. The whole point is if we, it’s, it’s like a hornet’s nest. If we, if we, you know, disturb the hornet’s nest, then all of Iran’s proxies are going to go hot at the same time, Just as if we were to fight China, North Korea would immediately invade South Korea and probably, you know, Russia might, you know, mass troops on NATO’s borders to try to draw U.

S. Military forces away from their military ally. I don’t think they would conduct any direct attacks on the US because our relations with Russia have improved massively under President Trump. But it’s just a very counterproductive in terms of if you’re wanting to increase security for America and for our allies and for Israel in particular, this is the exact opposite strategy that I would advise President Trump to pursue. Well, I think going with Hegseth’s rationale, that the Chinese are the biggest threat, which clearly they are economically, militarily, they’re clearly the biggest existential risk to the United States if there ever was a rival superpower.

Which is not to say that’s their intent, but, you know, in the realm of being realistic about, you know, just how empires expand and contract, we must presume that at some point the Sino sphere of influence will encroach upon the American one. And with that in mind, one of China’s lifelines is Iranian oil. So if you could interdict the flow of that, you may not be militarily fit to engage the Chinese directly, but this could be considered an asymmetrical style attack on the global supply chain that would arguably do more damage to the Chinese than it would the Americans.

Is this about China? I wouldn’t, I don’t think this, this is about China. Certainly Iran is a Chinese, a Russian Chinese military ally. They are part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Happened for the last two to three years, Russia has the defense pact separate from the SCO agreement with, with Tehran. So I don’t think it’s a direct move against China. I think it really is in furtherance of Israel’s, the America’s proxy war against Iran. That could go hot. You know, I joke that it seems, it seems like we’re, the US is taking orders from Netanyahu, like Netanyahu is choosing the targets, just like kind of we are for Ukraine and then Ukraine’s pulling the trigger.

But you know, in this case it’s the tail wagging the dog because, you know, the US obviously is a much more powerful, you know, nuclear superpower than Israel is. In terms of answering your previous question, my assessment, there’s about 38 Iranian nuclear sites and perhaps even more ballistic missile sites that are, you know, deep underground in hardened concrete silos. Most of those silos and nuclear sites are impervious to conventional munitions. Now one game changer could be the, I think it’s the SBU 57 bomb. That’s a 13, I think it’s a 13 ton bomb that’s dropped from B2s.

We’ve deployed over one. I think it was 38% by my calculations, 38% of our B2 nuclear bomber force to Diego Garcia. So that’s along with 10 B52s. It’s unclear whether those are nuclear capable versions of the B2 or conventional. But that would indicate, you know, again, preparations for a massive bombing strike. Now this could just be strategic signaling. This could be, you know, with the end of not, you know, military strikes, but forcing Iran to accept an agreement that they might may view as disadvantages to them. And those negotiations are ongoing and that’s been very positive.

But you know, there’s so many different possibilities. You know, Iran could retaliate by targeting and hitting, you know, our aircraft, our carrier strike groups. We have two carrier strike groups in the region. They could target any one of 50 US military bases in the region. If they sink one of our ships, you know, our carrier, for example, unlikely, but they could certainly put it out of commission with multiple missile hits. You know, that could result in hundreds, if not thousands of US casualties. In addition, the possibility of, you know, Iran deploying nuclear capable missiles to Iraq to launch them from Iraq, potentially against Israel.

And if they’re hypersonic, they could potentially evade, you know, Israeli defenses, just as the hypersonic missiles that Iran launched last year were able to succeed in doing. And then lastly, the, the primary threat that I, other than, you know, Iranian super EMP satellites detonating over the US to take out all of our critical infrastructure. That’s obviously the primary threat would be that, you know, I assess that China would almost certainly take advantage of, you know, a protracted US bombing or, you know, military campaign against Iran to, you know, conduct this massive blockade, if not full scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan with the judgment that the US Would be either unable or unwilling to respond militarily to that contingency.

Well, and that’s what I’m saying. Like, you know, the Chinese, if faced with this, what would essentially be an oil embargo on them, which would be perfectly in line with the MO of the tariff sanctions war, or how could you say trade war that is ongoing, they would be left with no other choice. And I mean, I’m always reminded of what started the Japanese involvement in World War II and something to do with, you know, which was very similar embargo on oil, which of course would not be a complete embargo because China has other sources of oil.

But they do. They are the main importer of Iranian oil. I believe it’s like 90% or something crazy like that. And it’s $35 billion a year worth of oil. So it’s a lot of oil. And for an energy starved nation like China, that could be very essential, if not existential. I did, I just wanted to comment. I did hear that Iran was moving ballistic missiles into Iraq. There’s a lot of scuttlebutt online, but this could just be another strategic posturing maneuver as well. I don’t know. There’s something that seems a little different about this with respect to the placement of all of these assets in Diego Garcia.

It seems like it would be really the penultimate flex in terms of strategic posturing. I don’t know if I’m of the belief that they just want to make a deal because. Let’s maybe talk a little bit about the deal because the JCPOA was something that was in place. What was it in the jcpoa, if you’re aware, if you don’t know the answer, that’s fine. That Trump took issue with. Was it something to do with uranium enrichment? We can’t forget, of course, the assassination of Suleimani, the history of distrust between the Ayatollah, the clerics there and the Trump administration.

What do you think they’re asking for that’s different this time in this JCPOA or 2.0? Well, there have been various reports from. Actually there are two different factions within the Trump administration. There’s kind of the America first faction that’s more reasonable, more foreign policy realist. That’s pretty much led by JD Vance into, you know, obviously a lesser extent by President Trump, who sometimes will, will side with each faction, just depending on the issue. And then there’s the neocon faction that’s basically led by National Security Advisor Michael Waltz and then Secretary of State Marco Rubio. And on, you know, in terms of the Middle east issue, the Iran issue, the neocon wing is definitely, you know, leading the president to, or advising him to pursue these, these policies.

But, you know, it’s just, it’s just a tremendously bad idea for, you know, for the Trump administration to, to be considering taking action like that. In terms of the jcpoa. The JCPOA was almost universally considered by conservative Republicans to be kind of an Iranian impeachment pact. I even assess that they likely, it likely sped up their nuclear weaponization program. You know, it gave them 152 billion. You know, there was 2 billion on, on a, delivered in a late night, late night plane flight by Obama, you know, some kind of, you know, weird bribery arrangement that he’d arranged, plus 150 billion that was freed up from, you know, previously frozen Iranian assets that had been, you know, frozen since the days of the Shah in 1979.

But in terms of verification measures, the JCPOA did, you know, really didn’t have any. You know, I mean, they basically gave Iran like, I think it was like 48 hours warning veto power over inspection sites. You know, if they, if they did allow inspections and they had 48 hours to like move things around to a different site to make it seem like they weren’t doing anything. So, and I think that’s probably part of the incorrect, you know, deep state US Intelligence assessment that, you know, Iran had chosen to, to freeze its nuclear program. You know, they’ve been developing ICBM since 2005.

You know, I think this is one of the data points that needs to be used to effectively counter that pro that theory that they’re not doing anything with their nuclear program. They’ve had an ICBM program since 2005. It’s essentially developed fully developed ICBM technology. We don’t know if they’re, they’ve operationalized any with, you know, ICBMs ready to fire at the U.S. they could range the, you know, at least some east coast cities. But there’s never been an instance in history where a country has developed ICBMs with that first didn’t have nuclear weapons. Right. I mean, there’s no point in launching an ICBM with a conventional munition.

It just would be the, the returns on that investment would be abysmal at best. Exactly. It’d be a tremendous waste of money. You know, certainly if they were, if they were years, if not a decade away, I mean, would make, would make some sense if they didn’t have a program. It wouldn’t make any sense at all. It’s just completely irrational. So in terms of the new Trump agreement, you know, the, the waltz, it’s why I mentioned the, the neocon faction and the Trump administration is folks like Mike Waltz are pushing an agreement which completely dismantles not only their weapons program, nuclear weapons program, but their nuclear reactors as well.

So they’re peaceful nuclear energy program. I think Wyckoff, you know, Steve Wyckoff is really a masterful negotiator on, on Trump’s, you know, on Trump’s team that’s been basically, he’s the fix it man for every foreign policy negotiation that Trump, Trump has been having with both Russia and Iran. And presumably he’d be used for China as well. If, if China blockaded Taiwan. I, I think Trump’s first move would be to, you know, have some kind of zoom meeting and start some kind of negotiations to try to prevent a full Chinese takeover. But the, the Wyckoff is his, his statement is it’s just the nuclear weapons program.

So essentially freeze or dismantle the nuclear weapons infrastructure, keep the nuclear reactors, the peaceful nuclear energy program in place. And that of course there’d have to be verification members that measures that we didn’t have in gcpoa. So it might not be just a GP JCPOA too, but a lot, truthfully, a lot of the details of what, what Trump’s wanting or what he might be willing to agree to just haven’t been really out, you know, out in the, outed in the public sphere yet. In terms of the waltz plan, it does include significantly curtailing Iran’s ballistic missile program as well.

And that’s, you know, they have one of the most, you know, the largest nuclear capable ballistic missile programs in the world. You know, I think China has the largest, Russia has the second largest. And now I think Iran, well, North Korea obviously has a huge one as well. So probably North Korea and then Iran would be the fourth largest. Well, in terms of Witkoff’s accolades, I gotta say, I mean he has a, a more conciliatory tone which could also be seen as strategic as well. Right. Like it’s kind of like it seems it’s maxed like as a good cop, bad cop sort of situation where there’s a lot of temporizing and stalling, it seems almost.

And if I’m the Iranians, you know, I’m not, I’m probably not trusting this guy, you know, regardless of how well meaning and intentioned he appears. You know, we have to always presume that this is some sort of tactic to pacify us in, in some respect, or at least get us to lower our defenses. And I mean, for me, I’m looking at the situation in Russia, which continuously seems to be escalating, regardless of whatever sort of conciliatory relations appear to be in play with Witkoff. And in particular, it seems like not much has really fundamentally changed besides rumors of a Russian ambassador heading back to Washington, which we should remember was the case up until, I think late 2024 when Biden started approving the launch of strikes into.

So we’re really far away from a resolution on that front. But in terms of what’s happening in Iran, I mean, it’s really difficult to say at this point, but it seems like the hawks are winning in many respects. And if Netanyahu and his cronies have as much power as you say, then it seems inevitable that they could create a certain set of conditions that would force Trump to act in, in Israel’s defense or something like that. So I don’t know, I, I. Could you elaborate maybe a little bit more on this relationship between, you know, the Israelis and what they want and what these neocons surrounding Trump.

Do you think that that’s going to actually materialize into a strike? Because it seems inevitable that even if Iran is engaged and, you know, playing ball, that somebody might sabotage the diplomacy. Yeah, I think President Trump, obviously, he has some very big Israeli donors, you know, billionaire donors that contributed to his campaign. So I think he’s been favorable, you know, towards Israel, pro Israel for, you know, for a very long time. But that said, you know, the day before he came to office, he was sworn in as president for a second term. He was able to negotiate, you know, pressure Israel.

He sent Wyckoff to pressure Israel into accepting a ceasefire. They didn’t want to agree to that. They’d been, they’ve been opposing Netanyahu in particular, had been opposing for a very long time in terms of their ability, you know, the neocons ability to force Trump’s hand. I don’t think they can force his hand. I think that they, you know, they’ve been advised, given a lot of bad advice, but I think Trump’s preference really is still to avoid, you know, I think he’s violated his no new words pledge with regards to Yemen because that was again, as we discussed, there’s no, there was no immediate rationale for that military campaign.

We could have at least waited until we thought the Houthis were going to make, you know, a first strike or a violation of their kind of self imposed ceasefire in the Red Sea to justify that. And, you know, they did it anyways, you know, on the pretext that it was going to happen, they were going to violate it and we just needed to, you know, preempt that. But I think Trump’s first, you know, his preference maybe not as much as in Russia or with regards to China over Taiwan, but I think his preference still is to make a deal.

And, you know, it could be a face saving deal, it could be, could be a freeze of their program. You know, Tulsi Gabbard, who I, I really like is the new Director of National Intelligence, but I think the prevalent, you know, intelligence assessment that Iran’s frozen ITS program since 2003 is completely dead wrong. But do you think she’s sincere in that assessment or do you think her arm is being twisted? I’ll be generous. I, I do, I think she’s sincere in that assessment. And that’s a very prevalent view. So I, I didn’t mean to demean anyone who believes that Iran doesn’t have any nukes because that’s, I mean, that’s the 90% prevalent opinion among national security analysts.

It’s just from my perspective, you know, the idea that a country that’s been, you know, kind of the mother of all terrorism, that’s, that backed the Al Qaeda terrorists that’s been supporting, you know, terrorist strikes against Israel, Obviously Israel’s had terrorist strikes in response to them, their neighbors. But the idea that a regime like that, that targeted and killed 800Americans during the war in Iraq, with, you know, I IDs. I had a cousin who actually served on the Iranian border and he was bombarded by Iranian artillery every day. They weren’t allowed to respond by the Bush administration.

The idea that regime like that would, would self limit itself when every national security incentive, you know, is present for them to build nuclear weapons, they were given that, you know, North Korea, I believe, shared not only missile technology, long range missile technology, but likely nuclear technology as well. There was, you know, reported earthquakes that occurred, I think in October of 2024. And I think more recently that analysts were suggesting could have been Iranian underground nuclear tests I think there’s been a lot of underground nuclear testing that we don’t know about it, but certainly Russia and China never stopped.

I think Iran is doing as well. And we do know that North Korea obviously has been testing nuclear weapons underground at their main test site, including hydrogen weapons. Yeah, I know in Iran is one of the most seismic regions on Earth, and I think a lot of those earthquakes were found to be at, at a depth that was too great to be a potential test. But I mean, it’s definitely possible. I mean, it’s, I just can’t get over the, the amount of weaponry that’s being amassed in and around the Middle east right now. It seems like you would only do that if you’re either getting ready for some mission creep situation where you establish some kind of foothold or you provoke a response.

And they’ve made it very clear that any attack by the Houthis on American warships is being in some way directed by the Iranians. And so these things are synonymous. So it almost seems like they’re setting us up for what was that, the USS Liberty 2.0 situation, where they can then say, well, you know, now that the Houthis have fired us, we got to do something. Right. And the question is, what could they actually do? And based on the, the accounts of Israel’s last attempt to target Iranian facilities, which is not to say that the Americans would same have the same lack of success.

They didn’t really seem to have much to show for that last attack. On Iranian radars, we had a few satellite shots of, have like a handful of images of destroyed buildings, but not what you would expect from the vaunted, you know, Israeli Air Force if they were to actually have conducted a successful campaign that neutralized all of Iran’s, you know, with one fail swoop, which just seems kind of ridiculous. Do you think there’s some mission creep going on here that they’re trying to put all the assets in the region maybe with? Because if I’m a neocon and if I’m the Israelis right now I’m looking at all the stars are aligned in a way that have never been aligned before.

You have a very pro Israeli Zionist president. You have a lot of people surrounding him who are for that cause. You have oil, which is very low. So at least for the time being, it wouldn’t have like an immediate crazy effect on the economy. It would, but not, you know, immediately. The, the U.S. reserves are starting to fill up again. You just have a variety of things. You know, you have the political capital to do it and on and on. So do you think that that’s the setup? Well, yeah, as I mentioned, this is a dual, the dual purpose contingency here we have the contin, the actual battle plan, contingency planning that’s occurring at the same time we’re engaging in strategic signal.

So I do think that Trump is intending an actual strike if there’s no progress in, you know, in terms of negotiations. Now, I would argue that the very fact that Wyckoff is meeting with the Iranian foreign minister, I don’t see that Trump would, you know, absent some, you know, very oppositional remarks or anti U S remarks by the, by Iran saying that, you know, we’re not going to negotiate anything, you know, something like that. Basically what Zelensky said to Russia. I don’t think that Trump’s going to launch, you know, this type of strike, you know, against Iranian, really any direct military strikes against Iranian territory so on as negotiations are still in progress.

So again, I think that’s very hopeful. But I think absent those negotiations, if Iran said we’re not going to talk to you, we’re not going to meet with you directly or indirectly, you know, do your best, you know us, we’ll, you know, we’ll take it, we’ll give back as much as we get. I think that Trump likely would engage in direct strikes against, against Iran. So if we see that the, the talks break down, I think that’s going to be a major red flag that World War III is on the menu again with, with Iran where it could escalate to the nuclear level.

And again, you know, you don’t, not only is Iran likely a nuclear and super EMP power, that critical infrastructure with super AP, you know, 100% and kill tens of millions of Americans, if not hundreds of millions of Americans within, within a year, as Dr. Peter Pry warned against, but they also have, you know, two nuclear superpower allies, Russia and China that could do, do us as much or far more harm certainly around the world where we could find ourselves waging global, you know, nuclear multi front, nuclear therm, nuclear war against all four nuclear superpower adversaries of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, which is exactly the scenario that President Trump has repeatedly stated during the campaign he is dead set to averting.

So I continue to believe that Trump is not going to want to take that risk. But I’m not sure if he really understands the real danger that Iran likely already has super EMP satellites above the US even if they, they may not have ICBMs capable of hitting US territory. Yeah, we can talk a little bit about that in a moment. I mean, it seems to me like there’s definitely some obligatory step that’s being fulfilled up the escalation ladder here. Like, I think the US had to @ least appear that they were trying to do something diplomatic so that once, whatever Black Swan event happens, they can say, well, we tried.

And, you know, the irrational, bad actor, pariah Iranian theocracy is not, you know, cooperating, so therefore we have no choice but to. To do some sort of military intervention. Right. I. I don’t know. Maybe I’m a little cynical at this point in time because I’ve seen this. This movie play out many times over, and it seems to be always the same script. Even if Trump was and had the best intentions, it seems as though they’re like, the people around him are setting up a situation that could easily be exploited at the drop of a hat. Like, if all it would take right now is an American warship, I think, to be hit by one of these missiles.

And I think they could use that. The outrage that was created by that, they could use to fuel an increased amount of airstrikes against the Houthis, which would, of course, beget even more of the same, which would, of course, create a positive feedback loop, which ultimately, at the end of it, their primary agenda would be Iran, because I don’t think Israel is ever going to have an opportunity like this again. And their global political capital is basically insolvent at this point in time. So, you know, the. The future generations are likely not going to support Israel in the same way the previous ones had.

So it’s kind of make or break for them at this point if this is something they really want to do. But my only. Like, if I’m a military strategist, which of course I am not, but having watched enough of these videos about why it’s not feasible and impractical to attack Iranian nuclear sites, much less their massive subterranean missile cities that are buried under 500 meters of granite, I would be thinking, okay, how can we do, like, some regime change? How can we wait them out, starve them out, and try to asymmetrically decapitate like we did Nasrallah? Because I think that’s the only.

But the problem with that is. And I. I know somebody who’s really in the know about this kind of stuff, they think that that would just create. Just like, if you were to do that in Russia, you’d. You’d have more hawkish people take control, who would be more willing to and wouldn’t have the restraint of the Ayatollah. What do you think of that assessment? Well, I think, I think that’s absolutely right. I mean, the more we do to, to threaten, you know, enemy countries, particularly nuclear powers, the more likely they’ll ultimately opt to use those nuclear and super EMP weapons against us.

So we’re in a sense, a sense we’re in this doom loop where we’re creating the very existential threats and crises that wouldn’t otherwise exist without our provocative actions. So, you know, as we’ve discussed in the war in Ukraine was, as Trump stated, was provoked by Joe Biden and to a lesser extent Zelensky because they refused to agree to Russia’s demand of no NATO for Ukraine. But this is not a crisis of Iran’s creation. And not only is it not a crisis which Iran or the Houthis created, it’s one that was created by the U.S. the Trump administration, specifically at Netanyahu’s behest.

But there’s, yeah, there’s just, there’s just no reason to create this crisis at this time. And it’s as Vice President Vance stated in the, you know, released signal group, you know, text, text that for which waltz should have been fired over, you know, it’s really off message for Trump because, you know, he’s pushing peace with Russia, but he seems to be pushing war with Iran at the same time. You know, so I, I would argue we should be making peace with Russia and probably making peace with China, cutting a deal with China over, over Taiwan, which maybe creates a new Chinese confederation shorter than annexation, where Taiwan gets to keep their own, you know, their own military, you know, control of their military, political freedoms, economic freedoms.

Obviously the, you know, the pro independence candidates would have to be banned. There have to be, you know, democratic, peaceful regime change. Resignation of the pro independence Taiwanese president. President WILLIAM Y. But this is just complete, it’s completely, completely unnecessary for us to be pursuing this situation. And the point I’m trying to drive home is, you know, containment works. The very fact, if I, if I’m right, if Dr. Peter Price right, if James Woolsey, former CIA director, is right, that containment has worked because Iran has had nuclear weapons for several years, they haven’t used it, you know, that that’s what the neocons are warning against, that they’re saying that as soon as Iran has even one nuclear weapon, they’re going to put it on top of a missile and fire it against Israel and then Israel will be, you know, suffer Hundreds of thousands of casualties.

And yet that didn’t happen with the Soviet Union. We had a Cold war. They had 44,000 nuclear weapons. They ended the Cold War with twice as many nukes as we had. It hasn’t happened now that Russia has over seven times nukes, more nukes than we have. China has likely has doubled twice as many nukes as we have. It hasn’t happened with North Korea and it hasn’t happened with Iran yet. And even though I believe all of those countries likely have either super EMP weapons over the US or orbital nukes that could conduct super EMP attacks that they could, they could conduct without us even knowing who, who attacked them.

So the idea that, that we have to have preemption of nuclear capabilities isn’t borne out by history. Yeah. Like the, the notion that they would just get a nuke and fire it off, knowing full well that it would lead to their destruction and that the United States would bomb them into the Stone Ages just seems, you know, like something people haven’t thought through clearly yet. That is the prevailing view amongst fair, fairly large part of the population that as soon as Iran gets a nuke, they’re going to use it. But it’s really absurd when you think about it.

Yeah. Especially when, you know, Tulsi Cabaren and all of U.S. intelligence is saying they shut down their nuclear program 22 years ago. So those two narratives, if, you know they’re going to get a nuke and they’re, they’re going to use it immediately. And, and yeah, they’ve shut down their 22, you know, their program for 22 years and they have a fatwa that says they, they can’t even have nuclear weapons. All those three narratives are being pushed and they’re all, they completely contradict each other. Yeah. Because right now they’re within spitting distance of, of doing that. So if, if that was their ultimate goal was to destroy Israel, well, they could just do that in a week even by, you know, the worst case estimates of how long it would take them.

So, yeah, none of these things really make sense. And that’s what tells you that, you know, I, I think this military buildup is very sinister, unfortunately. I think, you know, we don’t know the details of what’s being talked about in the jcpoa. I can’t for the life of me seeing anything different. I can’t see the Iranians making any concessions that go above and beyond what they agreed to previously. I mean, can you envision any concessions they might be willing to make because they’re not going to give up their nuclear program. And even if they did, if we’re presuming that if, you know that they have nuclear web or if you claim to, you know, be of the belief that there might be others who are of that persuasion already.

So in, in light of that, this would all just be redundant pr. Well, I mean, I think the best we can hope to achieve is what I proposed with North Korea, which is a nuclear freeze. You know, if we, if we were to get them, get Iran to blow up their primary nuclear research facility, weapons research facility, you know, that, that could be, that’d be a major win. And I think that’s really the best we can hope for. And then some kind of verification measures that they’re not developing anymore enriched uranium, which they potentially use for additional.

The weapons. But that doesn’t, you know, they’re never gonna, gonna show show their hand unless they get attacked. I think if they get attacked, they’re gonna, they’re gonna say, oh, by the way, we forgot to mention we already have a dozen nuclear missiles or we already have 50 nuclear missiles and we reserve the right to use them if in the event of further attacks on, you know, Tehran or, you know, our nuclear infrastructure or our missile bases. So I think, you know, I think that’s, that’s likely what they’re, what they would do in the event we were to strike them.

Yeah, like with North Korea, you know, the North Koreans have been able to endure, I think, largely because of support by the Chinese and having such a, a strict authoritarian regime that basically squashes dissent whenever it emerges. The Iranians, of course, have been forced to essentially have a similar model which all countries that eventually get sanctioned by the international community have to follow that similar pathway. The North Koreans have been able to maintain control because they have that direct support from China. But Iran, with the exception of this agreement with the Russians and the Chinese buying their oil, which are relationships that are far more tenuous, do you think that they would be able to endure, like, could they stave off regime change attempts? Much longer, in light of the economy there, which is in shambles, the inflation is through the roof.

People are getting very discontent about the situation. How much longer do you think they can basically keep things together? Well, we’ve heard this, this argument, you know, for decades, really, ever since the Soviet Union. The idea that we can, you know, achieve regime change against nuclear power and, you know, a major adversary, those, the neocons have been peddling those beliefs and, and I was recently dismissed from membership in an organization called the Committee for the Present Danger, China, because I oppose their, their crazy plan to, to achieve regime change in China. I mean, it just simply, you know, I, I agree.

Certainly, I support that. I just have to laugh at that when you say that, because that just seems so absurd. You know, you can’t do it in Yemen, but you’re going to do it in China. Good luck. Yeah. Yeah, exactly. Short of nuclear war, you know, nuclear strike in Beijing that wipes out their entire leadership outside of their nuclear command bunkers, you know, there’s simply zero possibility of that. And so I guess what I’m saying is I, I don’t see any real likelihood of regime change in, in Iran because they’ve, you know, they’ve destroyed the opposition.

Certainly they have the MECH terrorist group that’s really not that much better than the Iranians. I guess they’d be less, less anti American. But outside of that, there’s, there’s really no organized opposition to, you know, the Iranian, the Isola Committee and, you know, the Islamist regime in Tehran. So I think they can hold out almost indefinitely short of, you know, some, short of a US Invasion, which we have absolutely no capabilities to undertake because we no longer have a significant, you know, we have no military presence in Afghanistan and we have 2,500 troops in Iraq. And other than that, there’s, you know, no country border in Iran where we have troops.

So, you know, any, any ground invasion possibility against a country of 90 million people with a massive army and it’s three, three times larger than Iraq and much more defensible with the Zagreb Mountains, you know, on their western border? Simply just ludicrous, in my opinion. Yeah, interesting. Well, you know, maybe we’ll, we’ll come back to the geopolitical stuff in a moment, but I just want to ask you, has there been a change in the approach towards the EMP task force since Trump is back in office? And because I know that when he was in, in his first term, he had enacted some policy that looked at hardening the grid.

Is that something that is on the table right now? It’s interesting you asked that because I, There is a draft order on the table that we believe we could, we could persuade him to pass to an act to sign. And I just made, made some revisions to it. So that is, that is absolutely on the table. The order that we’re, and this is all very preliminary, you know, obviously, but the key. I’m not going to talk any specific specificity about the draft order that we’re discussing at a top leadership level. But the main difference is we believe there needs to be a funding mechanism.

There needs to be, you know, the main, main problem with the, the, the 2018 Trump order, which was really excellent, you know, terms of planning, preparedness, all, all that kind of stuff, it. There was no method to mechanism to fund the grid. So I’ve had some ideas. You know, one idea I’ve had is a, is a user fee that is tacked on by electrical power companies on both, you know, individual residential consumers as well as business consumers. And that could fund, that could generate, you know, 50 billion in four years at a very low rate. But, yes, the answer to your question is yes, we’re actively drafting an executive order along those lines.

I’ve noticed that Trump’s approach is one that’s far more strategic. And I’ve thought that Trump is strategically adversarial to the big players. China, Russia. And that’s evident with his emphasis on the space program, hardening the grid, the Golden Dome, Greenland, all of which is to effectively put the United States in a better position to fight major wars with global superpowers. But on a tactical level, on a wit cough sort of level, you know, they’re more willing to be diplomatic than Biden was, whereas Biden was tactically engaged in the Russians. But he wasn’t doing any of this stuff.

And in fact, didn’t he repeal the EMP thing and they didn’t put the defcon level up, you know, didn’t really worry about building bunkers, hardening grids, preparing the population. So I, I see that sort of distinction there, and I guess that’s one of the good things about Trump that I’m willing to concede, as a person who tries to be as apolitical as possible, is that in the very least, there’s some level of preparedness mindset there for the inevitable. Of course, what you’re talking about is a potential tax on, on. On people, which I don’t know how well received that will be, but if they understood the importance of it, I mean, if there ever was an important tax, it would be on protecting the power grid.

But that really requires so much education of the population to these threats. Who’s becoming further and further removed from understanding these things by the day? It seems like it’s just people have no idea how vulnerable they truly are. Is the EMP task force embarked on any public awareness campaigns in order to try to just, I mean, asides yourself, coming on podcasts, and Hollerman, who we’ve had on the channel before Peter Pry, who we’ve had on the channel when he was still with us. Is there any other plans that you guys have to, to educate people about this stuff? Well, we simply don’t have the funding to, you know, engage in a, you know, a public awareness campaign of the scale necessary to alert people about threat.

So we, we are focusing our resources towards engaging with, you know, top U.S. policymakers. Certainly I briefed members of Congress here in Utah and others have brief, brief members of Congress in their states as well as in Washington, D.C. but at this point, we’re focusing on engaging with the Trump administration. We do have highly placed allies who are, have been actively involved in emp, not the task force itself, but in associated organizations that have really focused on, you know, defending the US from the existential threat of super EMP attack and super solar storms and doing so through supporting hardening the grid.

So that’s really, I think, been our focus of late. Do people at a high level, do they understand the threat or do they just not perceive it? Is there a lot of pushback to the idea that this is something we like? Is it not seen as a credible threat by those who are in powerful positions? Well, President Trump has been brief briefed on this. I believe Secretary Hegseth has been briefed on this as well. We briefed the Biden Energy Secretary who’s now gone, former governor of New Mexico. So I think there is an awareness. The problem that I’ve seen primarily with members of Congress is they, they have so many bills, you know, their focus is on more domestic issues, you know, in terms of deficit reduction.

And if, you know, just like infrastructure resilience, such as the, you know, the infrastructure bill that was signed by Biden, the inflation reduction act, so called, that was 1.5 trillion that really did almost nothing, you know, in terms of grid resiliency, really kind of weakened our resiliency by pushing green energy is kind of the what, what Trump likes to call the new green scam. So, yeah, there needs to be a lot more, there needs to be a lot more focus on that. And I think that at a high level, I think it’s easier to be focused on these types of existential nationwide threats than for a, you know, a mere member of Congress who represents a district of less than, you know, 750, 800,000 people that, you know, is trying to focus on more kind of local and state issues versus, you know, that really lacks kind of the federal threat picture.

Yeah. And unfortunately, it seems that until there’s Some major event or until people have some sort of understanding in real world incident that occurs that can give them, how can you say, like a schema for what this might, how this might play out, then they’re really not going to appreciate the threat. And like you say, all of these other things are taking priority right now. Whereas if we find ourselves in a global conflict scenario, then this is one of the key vulnerabilities. And with the military who is hardwired to the civilian grid, you would think that they would have a vested interest at least doing this in places that they are dependent on first and then perhaps, you know, rolling the program out to places that are deemed less essential for continuity of government.

Is there because the, as far as I know, the military is dependent on the civilian grid. That’s absolutely right, yeah. It’s the civilian grid powers, I think 90 to 95% of the energy on US military bases. So if the civilian grid goes down, the military bases go down as well. I mean, so certainly they have backup generators, but nothing on the scale they would need to have a fully operational military base capability. So yeah, you raised a really good point. There certainly have been discussions between folks like myself, you know, leaders of associated organizations where we were talking about kind of an island strategy that would that first harden, you know, military base and military based power capabilities in terms of the local grid to establish kind of resilience centers across the country.

It’s unclear as to whether that’s something that’s ever going to be converted into policy, but that’s one of the things that we’ve discussed. But it would be kind of a precursor, it would kind of be a first step to a full national grid hardening campaign or funded effort. But you’ve seen a lot of survival movies where, you know, the, there’s like a US military base that’s fully operational and there’s a grid down situation everywhere else. So there’s nuclear bunkers, you know, where the, the leaders of the country have, you know, there’s some kind of government operation where they’ve been, have a continuity of government and they’ve relocated those to key military bases because it’s all kind of part of a plan, a contingency plan that existed before the apocalypse occurred.

So I don’t really, at this point, I don’t really think we have anything on that scale. I’m very skeptical as to whether the US government would be able to survive a super EMP event or anything of that nature. You know, a limited nuclear first strike. I think we need to do much more along those lines to prepare for Judgment Day. Yeah, it’s hard to know exactly what they have because ostensibly they would have to keep that secret. So if there is something there, it’s secret. I mean, if they have underground nuclear power reactors somewhere, you know, which seems like a no brainer, but that brings something else to mind.

Hollerman, Jonathan Hollerman, when he was on last time, he was talking about how other nations have hardened their grids or in the process of doing this. And it’s incredible to me that the Chinese in particular, if you look at their strategy, they’re building bunkers, they’re hardening their grids, they’re stockpiling all this stuff, they’re buying gold, they’re doing everything a prepper does. Yet in our society, we’re completely oblivious to these threats. And until, you know, it’s something which is just encultured into us to, I suppose it’s part of our strength. At the same time, the freedom of having to worry about those things frees up more capital for other, you know, endeavors.

But it’s just a, a crazy juxtaposition between east and west and the mentality. And they are much more prepared to ride out a disaster. And that’s what concerns me most, is that we really do underestimate their ability to ride out the mother of all disasters. Because I think if you put the Chinese with their far more homogenous, obedient culture, and I don’t mean that in a disparaging way, I just mean that they have a more collectivist culture where they’re perhaps willing to sacrifice more for their country than we are here. You know, that’s a scary proposition when you put those two things up against each other.

I mean, perhaps that’s why you just went out and got your own solar panel system that you were talking about before we went live here. Because you realize that this is a real threat. Yeah, I mean that, that’s really the issue is, is the US leaders that I’ve, I’ve talked to mainly in Congress and the neocons in general. I mean, they talk about war as something, you know, basically they claim that regardless of what our provocations are against, Russia or China would never, they would never use nuclear weapons. Because, you know, we, we’ve all heard the, the, the policy that if even one nuclear weapon is used, then it’ll automatically lead to a, a full scale thermonuclear exchange and the whole world will, you know, basically all life on Earth will be destroyed.

I Mean everything in that, in that statement is completely false. If nuclear weapons were used at the non strategic level, there’s a very good chance it could be contained because the reaction of the, of the power that has nuclear weapons exploding on our bases or allies in this case likely the US would probably say, okay, let’s have a pause, let’s have a strategic pause and try to discuss how we can de, escalate versus okay, now we need to nuke them back. And then they’re gonna, you know, in response to our non strategic nuclear strikes on them, they’re going to launch a strategic nuclear strike on us.

And the first target is going to be D.C. and then suddenly all the missiles are flying. I mean, certainly there are US Leaders that would be stupid enough to pursue that. I don’t think Trump’s one of them. I think, you know, he’s someone who understands that that’s something we want to avoid. But you’re absolutely right. Russian and Chinese leaders have long believed that Russians in particular have believed that nuclear wars can be fought and won by the side that best prepares for it. And I think they’re correct. I think that that’s, that’s always been a true proposition.

And we see that in, you know, not only Russia with, you know, has two underground nuclear command centers, Yamatau Mountain and I think Kavinsky in the Urals, where each one can support 30,000, you know, top Russian leadership officials and their families. But now China has those, has one as well that’s I think 70 miles northwest of Beijing. And they’re building one much closer to Beijing, you know, that each one of which could likely withstand direct nuclear hits from the most powerful US Nuclear warheads that we have today. So, you know, the US has nothing comparable. I mean, the closest we had, of course, was Cheyenne Mountain.

And that’s no longer really a principal operation command center for, you know, STRATCOM or you know, U.S. strategic command. So the very fact that, what I’m saying is the very fact that Russia has a missile defense system that’s 225 times larger in terms of ABM interceptors than ours and all these massive preparations for nuclear war. I mean, I, I read books in the 1990s when I was getting my second master’s degree from Georgetown University and National Security Studies about how, how vast the Russian preparations really were that they, they’d stockpiled, you know, like the Chinese are doing today, just vast underground reserves of food, fuel, strategic materials, the very, the very things they would need to restore an industrial civilization following A, you know, a limited nuclear exchange.

And they also have, you know, they’ve conducted nuclear war preparation drills for, in the mosque, you know, Moscow and other subway regions that are large enough to protect 40% of their population. Again, we have nothing like that. You know, I grew up wanting to, you know, dreaming about building a fallout shelter in my backyard during the 1980s before the cold War ended. And we don’t hear anything about anyone wanting to build fallout shelters or nuclear, you know, blast shelters, either government or individual, other than of course the billionaires that have, you know, have uh, those underground bunkers with, you know, security and luxurious accommodations.

And this is, it’s ironic because we’ve never faced this high level of a threat of nuclear war, as Biden said, since the Cuban Missile crisis than we do today. It’s very true. And while there is a resurgence of interest in prepping in Europe, which is still quite vanilla as far as, you know, prepping goes by American standards and, and other standards around, well, by some, you know, American prepping culture standards, certainly not the populace as a whole, it still has a long way to go in terms of getting where it needs to be. Now I guess I, my last question I’ll, I’ll pose to you is what is your worst case scenario for how things could play out in the three theaters? Because right now you have Chancellor Mers, who’s about to be the chancellor.

I’m not sure if he’s been actually officiated yet, but he’s talking about calling for a strike on the Crimean Bridge with Taurus missiles that he’s soon to provide to Ukraine. And you have the Europeans who appear to be interdicting any potential rapprochement between Russia and Ukraine. It appears as though there are so many interests, conflicting interests, which are working against any sort of peace negotiation in that theater. Everybody’s preparing for war in Europe now. It’s become commonplace. Taiwan is being encircled by a record amount of ships and aerial incursions by the Chinese. You have the situation in the Middle east.

So you’ve had a soberingly more and I say soberingly because typically on this channel everybody’s telling us the world’s going to end right away. So you know, in the sense that you’re, you’re giving us a more even keeled perspective on this and, and perhaps saying that there is a prospect for peace. But that said, what is your worst case scenario right now that’s compelled you to put solar, to install a Tesla solar roof? Well, previously during the Biden administration, you know, I think everyone felt like the world was about to end with when, especially in November after the.

The presidential election, which the Democrats lost, that he authorized the use of U.S. aTACMS missiles fired by Ukraine and deep and deep strikes into Russia, which Putin had basically said was, you know, potential nuclear red line for them, that they would consider an act of war that could escalate to World War iii. I guess, you know, in terms of the four theaters, I would say that UK and France try to inject, you know, peacekeepers, tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine. You know, Russia views that as an active war. They conduct, you know, strikes to target and kill as many of those as possible.

The US probably stays out of that, but then maybe conducts strikes against Iran. And that. That can. That leads to, you know, hits on US Aircraft carriers and bases and keeps escalating. And then at the same time, China decides to blockade or invade Taiwan, Trump is persuaded by the neocons to respond militarily to that. And then that, that escalates into, you know, Chinese strikes on US Bases in the region, sinking dozens of ships, killing thousands, if not tens of thousands of airmen, Marines and sailors. And then, of course, North Korea invades South Korea. So all of those threats, you know, they’re really, really kind of linked to each other.

They could all materialize very. In very quick succession. And certainly, I believe there has been war planning conducted by Russia and China. I think, you know, every other time that Russian and Chinese leaders meet together, they have a side meeting that’s not covered by the press that talks about, okay, here’s, here’s what our plan is. If the U.S. you know, attacks us, if they intervene in, in Ukraine or in Taiwan, this. These are the actions we’re going to take. This is the war plan. It’s going to be a joint war plan. We’re going to attack together.

Whether it’s cyber, whether it’s kinetic, whether it’s amphibious invasions. It’s really, you know, Trump is really the only president who’s done anything to try to disincentivize that. And I really think he succeeded in. In that. I think if we went to war with China, I think Russia would stay out of the conflict. And I haven’t said that. I’ve been saying the exact opposite. I’ve been saying that, you know, before he became president, before he began normalizing relations with Russia, I’ve been saying that Putin planned to conduct joint amphibious invasions of Japan, Hawaii, Alaska. I think those would all be, you know, if we were to go to war with Russia over Ukraine, I think those would be back on the table.

I think worst case scenario is we have a super EMP detonation, you know, satellite detonation over the U.S. we don’t know who it is, we don’t know which country to try to attack back and then our country collapses, falls apart. Canada might, would likely collapse as well and you know, we kind of, kind of split apart and, and begin starving in place with you know, no law and order and the military melting away. And then the Chinese I think would occupy the US west coast, likely western Canada as well. Russians would likely, even though they’re, I think Putin’s sincere about wanting peace with the US I think he would take advantage of a collapse of the US to reoccupy and annex Alaska, probably a joint occupation wise and Japan as well.

So that’s, that’s definitely my worst case scenario. Interesting, very interesting. And this super EMP that you’d say would have some plausible deniability to it, that would presumably be conducted via space based weaponry. Yes, yeah, we wouldn’t have, there wouldn’t be a missile trail pointing to the country that, that launched it. I assess that all four countries including Iran, North Korea, Russia and China likely all have super EMPs in orbit that they could detonate without warning at the push of a button. So we wouldn’t, we would not know who attacked us with any degree of certainty. And we might not even have the capability to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike on an EMP aggressor even if we knew who it was.

Yeah, we’ll have to maybe get you back on just to talk about specifically EMP related stuff again because what I’m curious to know is whether or not there’s been more research or advancements in truly understanding what the scope of. Because we have a lot of anecdotal evidence. There’s some testing that was done, but it wasn’t, you know, one to one testing because nobody wants to to damage brand new vehicles. So they’re not going to crank the MP voltage up all the way things of that nature. And I know there was Starfish prime and Operation Dominic that tested the impacts of, you know, high altitude nuclear weaponry.

But it almost seems like we need a more modern test to really, truly understand what the outcome of would be of these new weapons that are tuned for EMP use. Especially in light of the fact that there’s how many satellites up there now that our civilization is dependent on. So just I guess off the top of your head, in conclusion, is there any new Major developments in EMP research or is there any agency that’s working on that asides your own? Nothing I’m aware of. Certainly there have been tests at a low level kind of with conventional EMPs, where you know, the USAF, for example, the Air Force has tested the impact of EMPs on B52 bombers.

You know, our nuclear triad, as you’re aware, is, is hardened to a certain level about, you know, at least 50 kilowatts per meter, which is kind of the, kind of the pre super EMP standard. But super AP weapons of course have potential of emitting up to 200 kilowatts per meter. So it’s imperative that we hardened to that standard to ensure the survivability of Air Force One and our nuclear command and control system as well as our nuclear triad. So that could very well have been done. But of course you know, that’s probably highly classified as to whether that’s occurred.

But in answer to your question, no, I’m not aware of any organizations trying to kind of test or plot out what the EMP effects would be. I don’t think they would be changed at all. But certainly the congressional E and P Commission published reports as to what their assessment would be on the US And Jonathan Hollerman is also an excellent resource in terms of a grid down scenario of that nature. Well, in an increasingly technologically based world, it’s, it’s obvious that, you know, the effects would be far, far worse the further we progress along this trajectory.

So all the more reason to support initiatives like this like your own. Where can people find more information on what it is you do? Well, you can go to the EMP taskforce. Us again. Emptaskforce us there. We. You could volunteer both your time and money. We’re always in need of additional state volunteers to help lead our state chapters. We do have state chapters in almost every, all 50 states. But we need, yeah, we need more people to, to help, you know, spread the word. As you mentioned, in terms of both the public awareness campaign as well as meeting with members of Congress and even members of the state legislature and state governors.

We do have executive orders and you know, kind of generic bills that we were trying to push that Dr. Bry began having us push in 2020 that I’ve also been circulating here in my home state. Yeah, and go check out David’s substack as well. Incredibly informative and I look forward to your next publication on there. And, and I’ll just say I think the time for this is approaching. It seems like the atmosphere is, is right now for the climate is right in Washington for something like this to, to actually be taken seriously. And I think right now is a better time than ever for you, you guys to continue with your push for trying to harden the grid.

It’s a good cause and even though people might not think it’s very important now, when the lights go out, they’ll be certainly think it’s important then. So thanks a lot for coming out. I appreciate it. Well, thank you. And I really appreciate all you do to try to try to wake people up from the slumber with everything going on in the world. Yeah. And in the very least people got to get their their own EMP protection which comes in the form of hardening their own grid at home. But maybe we’ll talk about that more next time.

Thanks for coming on, Dave. Thanks Zane. Appreciate it. The best way to support this channel is to support yourself by gearing up@canadianpreparedness.com where you’ll find high quality survival gear at the best prices. No junk and no gimmicks. Use discount code prepping gear for 10 off. Don’t forget the strong survive but the prepared thrive stay safe.
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